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THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN CORPORATE
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the current issues and trends in
state corporation and securities legislation. There is a wide difference of opinion
as to whether state incorporation statutes should be primarily enabling acts, with a
minimum of regulation, or whether they should include additional protective pro-
visions designed to establish more adequate safeguards for shareholders and creditors.
A similar controversy exists in the field of state securities regulation, where varying
approaches range from little or no regulation to a maximum of it.
The competition among the states for corporate charters has been a dominant
factor in bringing about lax corporation statutes, although from time to time, indi-
vidual states have attempted to resist such pressures. More recently, the Model
Business Corporation Act,' sponsored and drafted by the American Bar Association
Committee on Corporate Laws, has exerted a considerable influence in several
American jurisdictions which have undertaken a revision of their corporation
statutes.2
In the field of state securities regulation, the Harvard Law School Study of State
Securities Regulation, under the direction of Professor Louis Loss and Edward
Cowett, has culminated in the "promulgation" of a new Uniform State Securities Act
which has as its purpose the promotion of uniformity in this area of the law.3 This
new Uniform Act has received the approval of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws4 and the endorsement of the House of Dele-
*A.B. 1927, Park College; A.M. I934, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1939, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley. Member of California bar; Tames W. and Isabel Coffroth Professor of Law, University
of California, Berkeley. Co-author [with Henry V. Ballantine and Norman D. Lattin], CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (1953). Editor, P-H STUDENTS' CORPORATION LAW SERVICE.
" Coia,,rE ON CORPORATE LAWS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
(1953); id., REVISIONS AND OPTIONAL SECTIONS (955); id., ADDENDUM OF REVISIONS, ALTERNATIVE PRO-
VISIONS AND OPTIONAL SECTIONS (957). These will hereafter be referred to as the 1953, 1955, and 1957
revisions.
'Included are Wisconsin (951), Oregon (1953), Texas (1955), Virginia (956), North Dakota
(1957)., Alaska (1957), and Colorado (1958). The Model Act was also used by Congress in enacting
a corporation law for the District of Columbia. See Campbell, The Model Business Corporation Act,
Business Lawyer, July 1956, pp. 98, io6-07.
'Louis LOss AND EDWARD CowETr, A PROPOSED UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT-FINAL DRAFT AND COM-
MENTARY (956). This temporary edition has since been superseded by a treatise on the state blue-sky
laws which also includes the new Uniform Securities Act with Official Comments and Draftsmen's Com-
mentary. Louis Loss AND EDWARD CowErr, BLUE SKY LAW (958). The Uniform Act also appears
in 9C U.L.A. 84 (957).
'NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COalsa'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 134-35 (1956).
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gates and the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association It has been
less warmly received by the National Association of Securities Administrators (since
renamed North American Securities Administrators), which, after having given
a guarded approval of the Act "insofar as may be practicable to promote uniformity
in legislation," has made clear that this gesture "was not intended to and did not
approve or recommend the Uniform Act for adoption in any state."
It seems particularly appropriate in this symposium to pinpoint some of the
difficulties in formulating an effective legislative program at the state level; to take
inventory of our past experience; and to evaluate these latest efforts to provide
guidance for the formulation of state legislation. In the last connection, special
attention will be given a determination of the extent to which the new proposals
will weaken or strengthen corporation legislation in our federal system.
I
CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
A. The Problem of Charter-Mongering: Corporate Homes Away from Home7
The regulation of corporate enterprise in the United States so as to afford adequate
protection for investors poses many complexities. Despite the tremendous growth
in the number and size of corporation, the interstate character of the economy, and
existing federal securities legislation, the states play a crucial part in the development
of effective techniques for the prevention of abuse of power by management and
majority shareholders and for the safeguarding of rights of minority shareholders
and other investors.
The power to incorporate is conferred by the states under general incorporation
laws. These statutes prescribe the corporate structure and the relationships be-
tween the management and the shareholders, between the majority and the minority
shareholders, and between classes of shareholders. The extent to which the internal
affairs of corporations are regulated varies markedly from state to state. The in-
corporation statutes of the more "liberal" states are essentially enabling acts, which
contain many loopholes for an irresponsible management and a minimum of pro-
tective provisions in the interest of shareholders. Their general laissez-faire character
is, in part, a product of our federal system, which permits the free choice of a state
of incorporation, regardless of where the business is to be conducted.8
181 A.B.A. Rep. 145 (1956).
'NAT'L ASS'N OF SECURITIES AD'eRS, PROCEEDINGS 112 (1956); N. Am. SECURMES ADY'RS, PROCEED-
rNGs 64-66 (1957).
'The phrase is suggested by Marias, Liechtenstein, A Corporate Home Away from Home, 12 Busi-
NESS LAw R 405 (1957).
'Compare the Canadian system. The British North America Act, x867, 30 & 31 Vicar. C. 3, § 92,
delegates to the provinces exclusive power to incorporate companies with "provincial objects." The
residual authority to incorporate all other companies rests with the dominion government. Dominion
companies have a federal right to carry on business in every province. Although a province may require
such companies to register with its government, compliance cannot be made a condition precedent to
doing business within its territory. They may also enforce general regulatory laws against a dominion
company, including tax and securities laws. A province cannot confer upon local corporations power
to do business elsewhere, but it can confer upon its companies the capacity to accept extraprovincial
RoLE oF STATES 195
These "liberal" state statutes date from the latter part of the last century, when
certain states began to revamp their corporation statutes so as to give the widest lati-
tude to corporate promoters and managers, with a view to inducing out-of-state
businesses to incorporate in the state and escape restrictive legislation at the business
homeY Vast numbers of corporations engaged in interstate business took shelter in
these corporate havens, even where no business was to be conducted in the state of in-
corporation. Moreover, "pseudo foreign corporations" were formed by incorporating
a purely intrastate business in a charter-mongering state solely for the purpose of
becoming liberated from effective regulation in the home state.'0 In the words of
Mr. Justice Brandeis :11
[L]ocal restriction seemed worse than futile. Lesser States, eager for revenue derived
from the traffic in charters, had removed safeguards from their own incorporation laws.
Companies were early formed to provide charters for corporations in states where the
cost was lowest and the laws least restrictive. The States joined in advertising their
wares. The race was not one of diligence but of laxity. . . and the great industrial States
yielded in order not to lose wholly the prospect of the revenue and the control incident
to domestic incorporation.
Where individual states have sought to resist these pressures, the "pseudo-foreign
corporation" has become the problem-child of all efforts at effective regulation.
A partial answer to the problem of charter-mongering might have been found in
the enactment of a federal incorporation statute applicable to some or all corporations
engaged in interstate commerce, possibly with a limitation based upon the amount
powers. Bonanza Creek Gold Mining Company, Ltd. v. Rex [1916] I A.C. 566. See generally
CORNELIus A. MArSTEN AND WILLTA.5 K. FRASER, CoiPA.Y LAW oF CANADA 24-28 ( 4th ed. 194).
* This movement, although it has an earlier history, received an added impetus with the New-
Jersey amendments of x888, which generally authorized corporate holding companies. N.J. Laws 1888,
C. 269, at 385. That same state enacted, in 1896, the first of the "liberal" general incorporation statutes,
eliminating any restrictions on duration of existence, contributed capital, or types of enterprises. The
Delaware incorporation statute of 1899 was modeled after the New Jersey original, but it emerged in
many respects with even more advantages for management. Charter-mongering statutes were later enacted
by Maine, Maryland, Nevada, and South Dakota, in some cases as defensive measures to retain corporate'
business rather than from conviction. See Compton, Early History of Stock Ownership by Corporations,
9 GEo. 'VsH. L. Rav. x25 (1940); Wright and Baughman, Past and Present Trends in Corporation-
Law: Is Florida in Step?, 2 MIAmi L.Q. 69, 86 (1947); JAmEs C. BONBRIGHT A"l GARDINER C. MEANS,
TuE HoLD NG COXPANY 55-64 (932); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557-64 (s933). For
current discussion, see Bedingfield, They Want to Get 4way from It All, N.Y. Times, April 21, 1957,
§ 3, p. I.
" See Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137 (955). In the international field,.
inducements to migrate as a means of escape from restrictive tax, labor, or other legislation or to conceal
ownership are also offered. In New York and ZUrich, organizations exist with facilities to activate a
Liberian corporation within forty-eight hours; if greater speed is needed, these correspondents have'
available, for a fee, corporate shells, already processed in Liberia, and ready for immediate delivery. See
Rudick, Foreign Domiciles for Corporations-4dvantages Offered by the Republic of Liberia, 12 BusiNEss.
LAWYER 257, 260, a6r (r957); Marias, supra note 7-
For collateral problems, see Surrey, Current Issues in Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment, 56
CoU m. L. REV. 81., 827 (1956); Baker and Meek, Tax Problems of Doing Business Abroad: Some
Practical Considerations, 1957 Vis. L. REV. 75 passim; Kronstein, The Nationality of International
Enterprises, 52 COLUtM. L. REv. 983, 986 (1952); Domke, "Piercing the Corporate Veil" in the Law of
Economic Warfare, X955 iVs. L. REV. 77.
"Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557 (1933).
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of gross assets. 2 Not only would this solution continue our present dual system
of regulation, but, unless a federal incorporation statute were made compulsory, the
net effect might simply be to add Washington, D. C., as one more place of incorpora-
tion.'3 Furthermore, except in a time of business crisis, when the currents of reform
are running strong, the probabilities are that a federal incorporation statute might
actually be more lax than that of some of the states more committed to regulation.
In any event, the drive for federal incorporation, which has evoked interest from
time to time, appears to have been blunted by the enactment of the federal securities
legislation administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 4
Quite apart from historical factors, the philosophical justification for the laissez
faire approach of state corporation statutes may be thought to rest in an abiding faith
"in the right of men to choose their own associates, make their own arrangements,
govern themselves and thus grow in responsibility without much in the way of either
hindrance or help from the state."'" Although this theory has a certain tantalizing
attraction, it overlooks the increasingly impersonal nature of the relationship be-
tween corporate management and the shareholders which results from the wide
diffusion of shares." It mistakenly assumes that lax state statutes supplemented by
common law provide adequate investor protection. Furthermore, it cannot be
regarded as the uniform or even the prevailing view in every state of the United
States.
B. Attempts at Improvement of State Corporation Statutes
i. The period from 1928-4o
A shift in philosophy began to be discernible in the movement to overhaul and
modernize corporation statutes which began in the late 1920's. The Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, after many years of study, recommended the Uniform
Business Corporation Act in 1928.7 In many ways, the timing was unfortunate,
as the weaknesses underlying the then existing system of corporate regulation
were not fully perceived. For these and other reasons, this search for uniformity
ended in failure. Although the Uniform Act was adopted by the states of Louisiana
(1928), Idaho (1929), and Washington (1933), with various modifications, it had
2 See Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regulation, 49 HARv. L. REV. 396, 404 passim
(936). And see Reuschlein, Federalization-Design for Corporate Reform in a National Economy,
91 U. PA. L. REv. 91 (r942); HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN, THE SCHOOLS OF CORPORATE REFOni. (1950);
E. G. Jennings, Federal Incorporation or Licensing of Interstate Corporate Business, 23 MINN. L. Rev.
710 (1939). For an account of this movement, see Louis Loss, SECURirIES REGULATION 58-62 (1951).
" See Berlack, supra note 12, at 404.
"See Louis Loss, SECmURITES REGULATIoN 6i (1951).
" The words are those of Judge Wyzanski expressing his view of the judicial policy of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts relating to shareholder derivative suits. Pomerantz v. Clark, ios F.
Supp. 341, 346 (D. Mass. r951). But see Dodd, Amendment of Corporate Articles Under the New
Ohio General Corporation Act, 4 U. CIN. L. REv. 129-32 (930).
16 See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932); THE DISTRIBuTION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE 200 LARGEST NON-FNANCIAL CORPORATIONS
(TNEC Monograph No. 29, r940).
"79 U.L.A. 115 (957).
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much less influence upon the revision of the Ohio statute (1927-29) 3s Between
1928 and 1933, the following important commercial states made great progress in
revising their statutes, using the Uniform Act as source material, but not as a
barrier to careful study and drafting in the light of changing conditions: California
(1929-33), Michigan (x93i), Illinois (1933), Minnesota (1933), and Pennsylvania
(933) . In some cases, the revisions were prepared by committees appointed
by the state legislatures or bar associations, assisted by corporation law specialists
drawn from the law schools. Very useful reports were sometimes prepared explaining
the sources and objectives sought to be accomplished2 A number of valuable
articles were written examining the many policy questions surrounding the drafting
of a well-balanced corporation statute.' By 1939, the Uniform Business Corporation
Act had been withdrawn as a "Uniform Act" and had been designated as a "Model
Act" for the stated reason that its subject was not one "upon which uniformity
between the states is necessary or desirable. 22
:2. Developments since World War II
a. The ABA Model Act. This movement for modernization and improvement of
the corporation statutes, interrupted during the war years, has been revived with
some curious results. In about 1940, the Committee on Business Corporations of
the Section of Corporation, Banking, and Mercantile Law of the American Bar
Association "was requested to prepare an appropriate form of Federal Corporation
Act for use in case there should ever be a serious demand for such a statute."
23
When this project was completed, the Committee was requested to prepare a model
act for state use.
The initial draft of the American Bar Association's Model Business Corporation
Act was published in 1946.20 4 The actual drafting was done by two or three members
of the Committee who were active in corporate practice in Chicago 5 This draft
was largely based upon the Illinois Business Corporation Act, although the Commit-
" Ibid. See generally, E. MERISICK DODD AND RALPH J. BAKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
20 (2d ed. 1951); HENRY W. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § II (rev. ed. 1946); Davies, Reflections of
the Amateur Draftsman of the Ohio General Corporation Act, 12 Wis. L. REv. 487, 488-9o (1937).
l See E. MERIucK DODD AND RALPH J. BAKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 20 (2d ed.
I95iX; BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note i8, at 45.
"0 See, e.g., THE ILLINOIS BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT ANNOTATED WITH FORMS (2d ed. 1947), pre-
pared and published by the Corporation Law Committee of the Chicago Bar Association. See also E.
MERRICK DODD AND RALPH J. BAYER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 20 (2d ed. 195).
SE.g., California: Ballantine, Plans for a Modernized Incorporation Law, 16 CALIF. L. REv. 425
(1928); Ballantine, Changes in the California Corporation Laws, 17 id. at 529 (1929); Ballantine, Ques-
tions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, ig id. at 465 (193). Ohio: Davies, supra
note i8; Davies, Shares Under the Ohio General Corporation Act, 4 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1930); Dodd,
Amendment of Corporate Articles 'Under the New Ohio General Corporation Act, 4 U. CIN. L. REv.
129 (1930). Minnesota: Hoshour, The Minnesota Business Corporation Act, 17 MINN. L. REv. 689
(933), 18 id. at 1 (1933); Solether and Jennings, The Minnesota Business Corporation Act, 12 Wis.
L. REV. 419 (1937).
239 U.L.A. 115 (957).
"Garrett, History, Purpose and Summary of the Model Business Corporation Act, Business Lawyer,
Nov. 1950, p. I.
24 Ibid. 2e5 Ibid.
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tee did not immediately reveal the parentage.2 0 Revisions of the 1946 draft were
made in x95o, x953, 1955, and I957.
In an article criticizing the Model Act (as of 1953) as "an invitation to irresponsi-
bility," a member of the Chicago bar has traced its evolution from revision to
revision and has pointed out "the trend of the successive drafts toward liberality
and protection of management and toward relaxation of safeguards to stockholders,
creditors and the public. 2 s Other writers have seriously questioned the basic philoso-
phy of the Model Act.2 The meager reports and explanations of the Committee
fail to disclose this process of erosion or to indicate why it was thought necessary
or desirable3 More recently, a member of the Committee stated his belief as to
the objectives sought to be attained in the Model Act:31
(a) a modern act; (b) a complete act; (c) a flexible act; and (d) a relatively simple act.
If the model act does not meet these characteristics it does not accomplish its purpose of
serving as a base for the revision of corporation statutes. It has been described as an
enabling act, and it is primarily that. It does not purport to be a policing act. The
policing must be left to blue-sky statutes and other statutes of that character, and to case
law defining fraud and delineating the obligations of majorities to minorities.
One would have supposed, on the contrary, that the purpose of promulgating a model
corporation act should be to propose changes which would correct existing defects
and abuses in our corporation statutes and in the practices of corporation finance.
b. Loopholes and deficiencies in the ABA Model Act. The extent to which the
Model Act fails to close loopholes which permit management abuse and to enact
provisions for the protection of shareholders and investors may be noted by com-
paring some of its features with those of the California Corporations Code, one of
the most advanced of the state statutes.32  Although the two statutes are similar in
"6 The first such disclosure I have been able to find is by Garrett, Model Business Corporation Act,
4 BAYLOR L. REv. 412, 424 (1952). And see Campbell, supra note 2, at 1oo, The Illinois statute had
been rather thoroughly dissected at the time of its promulgation. See Ballantine, A Critical Survey
of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, i U. Cm. L. REv. 357 (1934).
2' See note i supra. The 195o draft was published in Garrett, History, Purpose and Summary of the
Model Business Corporation Act, Business Lawyer, Nov. 1950, p. I.
28 Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act-Invitation to Irresponsibility?, 50 Nw. U. L. Rev.
I, 2 (1955)-
20 Wright, Current Developments in Statutory Corporation Law, 7 MIAaN L.Q. 1, 6-13 (1952); Emer-
son, Vital Weaknesses in tha New Virginia Stock Corporation Law and the Model Act, 42 VA. L. REv.
489 (1956). But see Gibson, The Virginia Corporation Law of 1956, id. at 445, 449.
" Compare the prefaces to the 195o and 1953 revisions. CoMMirrE ON CORoATE LAws, Aaar-
CAN BAR AssociAo, MODEL BUSINESS COsor o N Ac iv-xi (953); Harris, supra note 28, at 3-5
passim.
" Campbell, supra note 2, at 99-oo. (Emphasis added.)
"The California General Corporation Law of 1931 was the product of a very energetic and public
spirited state bar committee made up of practicing lawyers, assisted by Professor Henry W. Ballantine,
of the University of California School of Law, Berkeley. See Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois
Business Corporation Act, I U. Cm. L. REv. 357 (934); HENtY W. BALLAN'INE, CORPORAnONs 45 (rei.
ed. 1946). The statute was further revised in 1937. See Sterling, Amendments to California Corporation
Laws, z937: Readjusting Stock Structure, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 76 (1937). Under the supervision of the
California Code Commission, in 1947, the legislation was recast in form, without a change in substance,
and codified. See Buhler, 1947 California Corporations Code and Other Corporations Legislation, 35
id. at 423 (1947).
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many respects, they rest upon essentially different outlooks. The California drafts-
men apparently aimed at making their statute"5
...liberal enough to facilitate business transactions without undue formalities of checks
and balances, of votes and consents of shareholders, and applications to courts, and at the
same time not so lax that the management or the majority may manipulate the machinery
to the prejudice of creditors or investors or the oppression of minority shareholders.
In- a nutshell, what the Model Act lacks and the California Corporations Code seeks
to embody is an appreciation of the important role of shareholders and creditors in
any prosperous business community. Although a legislature should not attempt to
forge a conduit within which business transactions must be channeled, "freedom of
contract" should yield to the extent necessary for statutory protection of the legitimate
interests of the suppliers of corporate capital. A catalogue of some of the provisions
of the Model Act and the California Corporations Code will serve to point up this
difference in approach.
(i) Loans to directors. The Model Act prohibits any loans by the "corpora-
tion" to its officers or directors, but it may "otherwise assist its employees, officers
and directors. ' 4  Not only does the statute fail to preclude loans to such per-
sons by subsidiary or holding companies (a possible source of evasion), but it
leaves open the possible contention that "otherwise assist" would permit the
corporation to guarantee obligations, although direct loans were prohibited. In
contrast, the California statute forbids loans of money or property by a corporation
to a director or officer of the corporation or to the directors or officers of any of its
subsidiary or holding corporations, or any guarantee of his obligations by such
corporations, directly or indirectly. 5 The California statute is a much more tightly-
drafted provision, which leaves no doubt that the intention of the framers is to pre-
clude use of the corporate mechanism by the officer or director as a tool for his
own financial manipulations.
The Model Act forbids a corporation to make loans secured by its shares, but,
again, leaves open a loophole for possible evasion by the use of subsidiaries or holding
corporations. In contrast, the California statute prohibits a corporation from making
loans on the security of its shares or the shares of any holding corporation or sub-
sidiary, unless the holders of two-thirds of all classes of shares, excluding the shares
held by any benefited director, officer, or shareholder, consent, regardless of limita-
tions on voting rights.3 6 It is to be noted that the California statute allows some
flexibility by permitting such loans where an independent two-thirds majority of all
shares consent to the transaction. This provision may be particularly useful in
the case of a closely-held corporation.
Finally, the contrast between the two statutes appears from the facts of an actual
" Ballantine, Questions of Policy in Drafting a Modern Corporation Law, 19 id. at 465 (1931).
S
4
MODEL BUSINESS CopoRA'noN AcT § 42, 4(f), 43(d).
"n CAL. CORP. CODE § 823. See the 1957 amendment, Cal. Stat. 1957, C. 278. For the definitions
of "holding corporation" and "subsidiary corporation," see CAL. CORP. CODE § I18.
" Id. § 823. Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-22 (Supp. 1955).
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transaction. A corporation wishes to finance the purchase of its shares by an officer-
director. The corporation, instead of making a direct loan, agrees to deposit funds
with a bank, in escrow, with instructions to purchase the shares in the officer's name
on the open market, the certificate of stock being held in escrow, pending payment
of the purchase price in installments, with interest. It seems clear that this trans-
action would violate the California statute, although under the Model Act, the
corporation might be merely "assisting" its officer-director3 7
(2) Indemnification of directors. The Model Act permits the corporation to
indemnify any director or officer for expenses actually and necessarily incurred by
him in connection with the defense of any action except where he is adjudged liable
for negligence or misconduct in the performance of duty. This provision is lifted
from section 122(iO) of the Delaware Corporation Law, although that type of
statutory solution had previously been subjected to very severe and justifiable crit-
icism 38 Under this language, the director or officer would always be entitled to
reimbursement for amounts paid to compromise or settle the controversy and for
litigation expenses (including attorneys' fees), even though the settlement was
effected without an adjudication of the issue of negligence or misconduct, without
court approval of the settlement after notice to shareholders, and without a judicial
determination that the defendant's conduct equitably merited reimbursement and
that the amounts paid were reasonable30 Moreover, the section is not exclusive, so
that the avenue is left open for a bylaw allowing indemnity, even though the di-
rector or officer is adjudged to be liable for negligence or misconduct. In California,
on the contrary, instead of encouraging or permitting undue "freedom of contract"
to vary the legislative rule, the statute is made the exclusive source of the right to
indemnification. In order to be entitled to reimbursement for litigation expenses,
a director or officer must be "successful" in whole or in part, or the proceeding must
have been settled with approval of the court. In addition, the court must find that
his conduct "fairly and equitably merits such indemnity."40
By a 1957 amendment to the California Corporations Code, the corporation may
also reimburse a director, officer, or employee for expenses or for any judgment or
fine rendered against him in any action brought by a third person, if the board of
7 Cf. Billings v. Trask, 30 Hun 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 1883); Rubenstein v. Kasprzak, 96
N.J. Eg. 406, 124 At. 362 (1924).
"8 Ballantine, California's 1943 Statute as to Directors' Litigation Expenses: An Exclusive Remedy for
Indemnificqtion of Directors, Officers and Employees, 31 CALIF. L. REv. 515, 516 passim (1943). Cf.
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT § 4(0).
Mr. Charles %V. Steadman, a member of the ABA drafting committee, has explained the choice of
the Delaware prototype: "It was our feeling that its simplicity was to its advantage. It is an un-
complicated statute. It has further the advantage of flexibility of leaving to each corporation and
to the shareholders of the corporation the decision as to whether or not there should be indemnifica-
tion." What's New in Corporation Laws-Indemnification of Directors, Business Lawyer, Jan. x953,
pp. 1, 9. Cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(10) (1953).
" See Neuberger v. Barrett, 18o Misc. 222, 39 N.Y.S2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Tichner v. Andrews,
193 Misc. 1o5o, 85 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 3949); Dornan v. Humphrey, 278 App. Div. soio, 1o6
N.Y.S.2d 142 (4 th Dep't 395i); Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 12o N.E.2d 8i9 (1954).
"' CAL. CORP. CODE § 830.
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directors determines that he was acting in good faith within what he reasonably
believed to be the scope of his employment or authority and for a purpose
which he reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation or its
shareholders. This proviso, however, does not apply to derivative suits. 41
The California statute, thus, proceeds upon the theory that the right of in-
demnification should be subject to rather strict statutory regulation to prevent abuse
and that directors and officers should not be permitted to thwart that policy by
resort to management-sponsored article or bylaw provisions.
(3) Interested directors' contracts. According to the Model Act, executive com-
pensation may be fixed by the board of directors, unless otherwise provided in the
articles of incorporation. Section 4(p) authorizes the corporation to establish
stock option plans and stock bonus plans for directors, officers, and employees. The
1955 revision contains an optional section with respect to stock options and rights;
if such rights or options are to be issued to the directors, officers, or employees of the
corporation or of any subsidiary, the terms of the transaction must be approved by
shareholders representing a majority of the voting power.42  But apparently this
requirement may be dispensed with and is subject to inconsistent provisions in the
articles.
The Model Act attempts no statutory solution of the broad problem of interested
directors' contracts. It is customary in the United States to insert in the articles of
incorporation or the bylaws clauses permitting interested directors to contract with
the corporation and allowing contracts between corporations with common directors.
Many of these directors' exculpatory clauses purport to give an unrestrained authori-
zation for contracts with directors or corporations with common directors, despite
fraud or unfairness or the lack of an independent quorum or vote."
On the other hand, the California statute seeks to displace the confusing and
sometimes contradictory common-law rules, as well as all immunizing and ex-
culpatory clauses, with specific statutory regulation. If a director or officer is
financially interested in any corporate transactions, his presence at the meeting of the
board of directors approving the transaction will not invalidate the transaction,
provided his interest is known or disclosed and the transaction is approved in good
faith either by a disinterested majority of the directors or by a majority of the share-
holders entitled to vote, or provided the transaction is just and reasonable as to the
corporation at the time it is so authorized, even though his vote was necessary for
director approval.45 Whether or not one agrees with the particular solution sug-
"'Cal. Stat. 1957, C. 226x, § 3. Cf. Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 113
N.E.2d 533 (1953).
" MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT § 18A.
"' See HE RtY W. BALLANmn, NOniAN D. LArrIN, A"] RICmARD W. JENNm Gs, CAsEs AND MATERIALS
ON CoRPoRATo Ns 300 (2d ed. 1953); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107
(Sup. Ct. i952).
"CAL. CoRP. CODE § 820.
"Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 1o9 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952);
Comment, Effect of Statutes on Contracts Between Corporations With Common Directors, 51 Micn. L.
REV. 705 (1953). Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-30 (Supp. 1955), which follows the California pattern,
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gested by the California statute, it seems advisable to reduce the problem to statutory
regulation, thereby foreclosing immunizing or exculpatory clauses, which are usually
prepared by or for management.
(4) Shareholder control of bylaw amendments. The Model Act places the power
to adopt the original bylaws in the board of directors and also the power to amend
or repeal them, unless the articles reserve such power to the shareholders.40 In
California, the shareholders may adopt, amend, or repeal the bylaws, with the
board of directors also having such power, subject to being overridden by share-
holders possessing a majority of the voting power4  Moreover, articles or a bylaw
adopted by the shareholders may limit or deprive the directors of the authority to
make or repeal bylaws. Although the articles or bylaws may provide for a super-
majority vote of shares to alter the bylaws, the shareholders cannot be completely
deprived of their amendatory power.
California does not make the power of shareholders to change bylaws dependent
upon the terms of the original articles. The Model Act allows an undue "freedom
of contract," for it is common knowledge that the articles are generally prepared by
the promoters' or managers' attorneys with a view to giving them as free a rein as
possible. To the extent that the Model Act makes it more difficult for share-
hofders to make changes in the bylaws, it encourages a dictatorship of directors
between annual elections.
(5) Shareholder representation and voting rights. The Model Act, like the Cali-
fornia statute, contains a mandatory provision for cumulative voting for directors.48
At the same time, however, that Act allows this policy to be frustrated by permitting
the classification of directors and the staggering of their terms of office over as much
as a three-year period,49 a practice expressly prohibited in California. 0 Furthermore,
in California, except where the articles provide for a maximum and minimum
number of directors (which cannot be less than five), only the shareholders can
amend the bylaws or articles to change the authorized number of directors."' But
even where the directors are authorized to adopt a bylaw fixing the exact number of
directors, this may be superseded by shareholder action. If the bylaws are amended
to reduce the authorized number of directors below five, the votes of shareholders
holding more than eighty per cent of the voting power are necessary. 2 This pro-
vision forestalls any scheme to minimize the effectiveness of cumulative voting by
reducing the number of directors below five and, thus, guarantees representation on
the board of directors to any shareholder or group having at least twenty per cent
of the voting power. In contrast, under the Model Act, the authorized number of
except that shareholder approval must be given by a majority of the voting power, other than the shares
owned or controlled by the adversely-interested directors.
" MODEL BusINESS CORPORATION Acr § 25.
'"CAL. CORP. CODE § 500.
"'MODEL BusINEsS CoR'oaAToN AcT § 31.
" Id. § 35. The board must consist of nine or more members for this section to become applicable.




directors may be changed by amendment of the bylaws, and, as we have seen, the
articles may vest the power to amend in the board of directors exclusively. 5 Thus,
another device for crippling cumulative voting is countenanced by the Model Act.
(6) Removal of directors. It has been generally held, in the absence of statute
or a provision in the articles or bylaws, that shareholders may not remove a director
from office before the expiration of his term, except for cause.5" The articles of in-
corporation or bylaws sometimes provide that a majority of the shareholders may
remove a director, with or without cause, before the expiration of his term of office.55
In the absence of such a provision or statutory authority, even an overwhelming ma-
jority of the shareholders may find it difficult or impossible to remove an intrenched
board of directors between annual elections.56
The authority of shareholders to remove directors at will is obviously an important
safeguard and means of maintaining shareholder control over the board of directors.
Accordingly, an increasing number of states (including California) have enacted
statutes which authorize some specified majority of the shareholders to remove the
directors at any time.57 The California statute contains an important further safe-
guard designed to protect the cumulative voting rights of minority shareholders
where less than the entire board of directors is removed.5" On the other hand, it is
surprising to find that the Model Act fails to confer a statutory power of removal
upon the shareholders, although it seems to be contemplated that such a power might
be conferred by the articles or bylaws.59 It should be noted, however, that the 1955
revision of the Model Act does contain an "optional section" granting a statutory
right of removal, which also preserves the rights of shareholders under voting systems
calling for cumulative voting and the classification of boards of directors and the
staggering of their terms of officef0 Unless this optional section is enacted, how-
ever, the Model Act, as such, confers upon the shareholders no statutory right to
remove the directors.
"' MODEL BUSINESS CoRPoRAToN ACr § 25.
"Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957); People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 201
N.Y. 194, 94 N.E. 634 (I911); BALLANTINE, Op. Cit. supra note r8, at 434; 2 WILLIAm M. FLETCHER,
PRIVATE CORPORATrONS § 352 (Perm. ed. rev. repl. 1954).
"See In re Rogers Imports, Inc., 2o2 Misc. 761, 116 N.Y.S.2d io6 (Sup. Ct. 1952), Note, 66 HARv.
L. REV. 531 (1953).
"8 See HENRY W. BALLANTINE, NORMAN D. LArnrN, AND RICHARD W. JENNINGS, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CoRa'oRaKroNs 280 (2d ed. 1953).
"CAL. CORP. CODE § 8Io; MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 48 (I951); MINN. STAT. § 301.29 (1953);
Morr. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 15-408 (1955); PA. STAT. tit. 15, § 2852-405 (1936); VA. CODE ANN. § 13-200
(Supp. 1956); WASH. REv. CODE § 23.36.040 (195). In all, twelve states have enacted provisions for
shareholder removal of directors, with or without cause. In addition, four others provide for such power,
unless the charter or bylaws restrict or nullify it.
"8 CAL. CoRI'. CODE § 2235. Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington also have somewhat
similar legislation. Cf. In re Rogers Imports, Inc., 202 Misc. 761, ii6 N.Y.S.2d io6 (Sup. Ct. i952);
Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 858 (Del. Ch. 1957).
" See What's New in Corporation Laws-Removal of Diretcors, Business Lawyer, Jan. 1953, PP. 27,
30 (statement by Charles W. Steadman, member of the drafting committee).
0 MODEL BUSINESS CoRPoRAoION AcT § 36A. The 1955 revision introduces alternative and optional
provisions to certain sections of the 1953 revision. Optional subjects concern matters which may be
included in a state statute, but which were intentionally omitted as not "essential."
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(7) Repurchase of shares. The Model Act permits a corporation to purchase
shares out of earned surplus or, if the articles permit or two-thirds of the voting
power consent, out of capital surplus.6 ' As the promoters of the corporation
normally dictate the initial charter provisions, it would be a rare case where the
corporate managers in a Model Act jurisdiction would not avail themselves of this
"freedom of contract." Conferring such an unrestricted power upon the corpora-
tion to deal in its own shares sanctions abuses which are prejudicial to the rights of
creditors or preferred shareholders or which may favor the inside or influential share-
holders at the expense of the outside shareholders. 2 In contrast, the California
statute allows, with some exceptions not of general application, purchase of common
shares only out of earned surplus.6 3 In a one-class situation, surplus arising from the
reduction of stated capital may be used to purchase common shares under safeguards
designed to prevent discrimination in favor of insiders.64 In a two-class situation,
paid-in surplus and reduction surplus are available only for the purchase or redemp-
tion of preferred shares subject to redemption, at not to exceed the redemption
price3 5 Preferred shares not subject to redemption may be purchased only by
the use of reduction surplus, upon reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, at not
more than the lowest liquidation price for the shares 6
(8) Grant of immunity to foreign corporations. Although the Model Act is
primarily an incorporation statute, under section ninety-nine, jurisdictions enacting
it are asked to sign away any right to regulate the internal affairs of foreign, or even
pseudo-foreign corporations. That section, in part, provides:
A foreign corporation shall not be denied a certificate of authority by reason of the
fact that the laws of the state or country under which such corporation is organized
governing its organization and internal affairs differ from the laws of this State, and
nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to authorize this State to regulate the
organization or the internal affairs of such corporation.
This escape hatch serves as an open invitation to corporate managers to in-
corporate away from home if they consider the Model Act to be too restrictive, as
well as insures that foreign corporations, wherever organized, will be entirely free
from local regulation in the crucial area of management-shareholder relationships.
Because of the limitation on regulation "in this Act," however, it is believed that
the adoption of section ninety-nine would not prevent the exercise of broad powers
for the protection of investors under a state blue-sky law.
Not all of the provisions of the Model Act compare unfavorably with the Call-
eId. § 5.
"See Note, Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own Preferred Shares With Dividends in Arrears, 14 U.
Cm. L. REv. 66 (1946); Note, Stock Repurchase Abuses and the No Prejudice Rule, 59 YALE L.J.
1177 (1950).
"CAL. CORP. CODE §§ I706-08. "Id. § 19o6. Orbid.
"
6 Ibid. For a superb analysis of the Model Act sections relating to dividends and other distributions
to shareholders, see Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, 70 HAMv.
L. REV. 1357 (i957).
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fornia statute; many provisions of the two acts are quite similar. For example, both
provide substantial class-voting protection for preferred shareholders who may be
adversely affected by charter amendmentsP Nevertheless, the foregoing comparison
of the two acts on a substantial number of crucial matters, while by no means
exhaustive, highlights the fact that the accent in the Model Act is upon simplicity
and flexibility at the expense of fair and adequate protection of the shareholders
against potential management abuse, whereas the California statute embodies many
more regulatory provisions resulting in additional protection to shareholders and
creditors. In short, the Model Act is misnamed. Far from being a "model," it is
too simple, too flexible, and too full of loopholes and deficiencies in favor of
management. It appears to be a product of either poor drafting or (what is more
likely the case) too close attention to the wishes of corporate clients and too little
concern for the public interest and the protection of investors. 8 We have a right
to expect a higher standard of performance from a quasi-public committee. It is not
too much to ask that the Committee be infused with new blood and that its position
on a number of vital points be re-examined.
c. The North Carolina Business Corporation Act of 1957-An Experiment in
Corporate Regulation. The North Carolina revision program has been described
elsewhere. 9  This work was carried out under the supervision of the General
Statutes Commission, an official state agency. The actual drafting was the work
of corporation law specialists drawn from the law schools of the stateY°
The draftsmen not only sought to prepare a "technically excellent enabling act,"
but also made a conscious effort to develop built-in safeguards for the protection
of the outside shareholders.71 A number of these innovations deserve careful study.
There is, for example, a mandatory dividend provision designed to prevent "squeeze
plays" on minority shareholders in closely-held corporations."2 There are statutory
restrictions upon the repurchase of shares, the aims of which are to prevent favoritism
or discrimination among shareholders."3 A "dominant shareholder" provision re-
MODEL BUSINESS CoRPoRATioN Aar § 55; CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 3634, 3635.
18 Cf. Emerson, supra note 29, at 53X-34. See Seward, The Movement for Modernization for Our State
Corporation Laws, 186 Com. & FiN. CIMON. 14, 34, 35 (1957), for a frank explanation of the motiva-
tion behind the ABA Model Business Corporation Act. Law firms and corporations "interested in corpora-
tion law" are being tapped for some $182,000 to finance the preparation of an annotation of the Model
Business Corporation Act and the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act.
" Latty, Powers, and Breckenridge, The Proposed North Carolina Business Corporations .4ct, 33
N.C.L. REv. 26 (1954); Powers, Drafting a Corporation Code for North Carolina, io ARK. L. REv.
37 (1955); Latty, Uncertainties in Permissive Sources of Dividends Under Present GS. 55-r16, 34 N.C. L.
REv. 261 (1956); Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act,
id. at 432.
7' Professors E. R. Latty, Duke University School of Law; L. S. Powers, Wake Forest School of
Law (now at University of Florida College of Law); and M. S. Breckenridge, University of North
Carolina School of Law.
7 "Powers, Drafting a Corporation Code for North Carolina, io Aiuc L. 1REv. 37, 39-41 (1955).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-500) (Supp. 1955); Powers, Drafting a Corporatior Code for North Caro-
lina, so ARE. L. REv. 37, 42 (1955). Moreover, special attention is given to the problems of the
closely-held corporation. See Latty, The Close Corporation, and the New North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, 34 N.C. L. REv. 432 (1956).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52 (Supp. X955).
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stricts loans to controlling shareholders as well as to officers and directors74 Ex-
culpatory and indemnification provisions in charters and bylaws have, in general, been
banned in favor of direct statutory regulation. 1 Bylaw provisions authorizing
bonuses to corporate officers measured by income or volume of business have a
terminal effectiveness of five years, unless renewed by a majority shareholder
vote.76
A number of provisions are specifically concerned with strengthening the position
of preferred shareholders and protecting them against inequities. Conventional non-
cumulative preferred share contracts are prohibited; for the future, only the cumula-
tive-if-earned variety will be allowed. 77 A helping legislative hand is extended
when preferred shareholders are confronted with an unfair plan of recapitalization.
Class voting on charter amendments, mergers, and consolidations is mandatory, even
as to preferred shares which are otherwise nonvoting.7" In the event of prejudicial
changes in preferred shares, whether effected by direct charter amendment, merger,
consolidation, or a "voluntary plan of recapitalization," an appraisal right is given
to dissenters.79
The rights of appraisal by dissenting shareholders is enlarged in one other respect.
Added to the usual provision for appraisal in mergers and consolidations is a special
feature conferring an appraisal right to dissenters of the selling corporation where
a business combination is effected by a sale of all assets in exchange substantially for
shares of the purchasing corporation! 0
Perhaps the most unique feature of the North Carolina legislation is the attempt
to police a large number of potential abuses and inequities through direct legislation,
rather than through the use of a strong state securities act.
One proposal, which was eliminated from the final statute, was a rather ingenious
attempt to forestall circumvention of the statute by out-of-state incorporation, the
"pseudo-foreign corporation" problem to which reference has previously been made.8'
The draftsmen, recognizing the possibility that corporations might flee to more
hospitable shores, made certain of the shareholder protective provisions applicable to
"pseudo-foreign corporations." This term included 2
... a foreign corporation which after the enactment of this chapter obtains for the first time
a certification of authority to transact business in this State and which engages in no
substantial business activity in the state or country of its incorporation, and which, by
virtue of the place and character of its business and personnel, is more closely identified
with the business life of this State than with any other state or country; but the term does
not include a corporation formed under or by laws of the United States.
74 1d. § 55-2(6), 55-22. Cf. CAL. Corp. Cona § 823, which overlooks this problem.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-20, 55-30 (Supp. 1955).
">Id. § 55-x6(a)(3). '"Id. §§ 55-2(5), 55-40(c).
78 d. §§ 55-100, 55-101. 7 'Id. §§ 55-102, 55-113.
'Old. § 55-113.
8"Supra note io and text to which cited. The General Statutes Commission submitted to the 1955
North Carolina General Assembly a proposed new Business Corporations Act. S. 49 (1955).
2 1d. §§ 55-2(11), 55-2(12); see also id. § 55-19(c), 55-134, 55-135, 55"136.
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Space does not permit an exploration of all of the various ramifications of this
statute.s3  It must be noted, however, that the jurisdictional base is that of doing
business within the state and identification with the business life of the state, rather
than the issue or sale of shares within the state, or even ownership of shares by
residents of the state. Thus, the proposal would apparently have been applicable
where a Massachusetts corporation, all of whose shareholders were and continued to
be residents of Massachusetts, transferred its operations from Massachusetts to North
Carolina. Under such circumstances, the policy of imposing North Carolina
standards in management-shareholder relationships is questionable. Nevertheless,
at least an attempt was made to solve one of the most delicate questions in the area
of interstate relations: How may a state protect its general incorporation statute
from subversion through foreign incorporation? It is believed that any such
policing should be accomplished through administration supervision under a state
securities act. The second part of this paper will be concerned with this problem.
II
STATE SECURITIES ACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF CORPORATE REGULATION
If a state desires a general incorporation statute with more regulatory provisions
to safeguard investors along the lines of the California and North Carolina statutes,
some means must be found to minimize and discourage circumvention of the
statutes through out-of-state incorporation. We have seen how the draftsmen of
the North Carolina statute attempted to meet this problem by a limited "domestica-
tion" of quasi-foreign corporations. Another method which has not been given the
recognition which it deserves is that of using the state securities acts or "blue-sky"
laws as instruments of corporate regulation. The chief interest of the state in these
matters is that of protecting its shareholders against unfair and inequitable share
structures loaded in favor of promoters and managers. The time to check these
arrangements is when the corporation proposes to issue or sell securities. Even a lax
corporation statute may be strengthened by a strong "blue-sky" law, and a more reg-
ulatory corporation statute can be buttressed by a fair but effective state securities
statute. In this connection, it is important to consider the various types of blue-sky
laws and their strengths and deficiencies as instruments for providing a greater
measure of protection for shareholders against potential management abuses.
A. Types of Securities Acts
There is no general agreement as to classification of securities acts! 4 In order
to highlight basic differences in approach and to point up the scope and limitations of
"'The proposed statute was discussed in Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137
(1955).
"'See Dalton, The California Corporate Securities Act, 18 CALiF. L. REv. xx5, 116-28 (1929);
Smith, The Relation of Federal and State Securities Laws, 4 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROs. 241 (937);
Wright, Correlation of State Blue Sky Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 258
(1941); Louis Loss, SEcuauris REGuLATIoN 19-44 (195); Louis Loss AND EDWARD CowErr, BLUE SKY
LAW 17-42, 283-84 (1958).
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the various types, my preference is for a division into four classes or combinations of
classes: (i) fraud prevention; (2) licensing of broker-dealers; (3) qualification of
securities, restricted to fraud prevention by compelling "full disclosure"; and (4)
qualification of securities, with the imposition of varying degrees of substantive regu-
lation of the terms and conditions under which securities may be sold or issued.
i. Fraud prevention
The antifraud statutes, of which the Martin Act in New York may be regarded as
the prototype, are only a step removed from the individualistic approach of the civil
and criminal law. 5 The attorney-general of the state is authorized to prevent
"fraudulent practices" in the purchase and sale of securities by resort to the tech-
niqies of investigation, injunction, and criminal prosecution88 Curiously enough,
the Martin Act "goes no further than to say that a fraud or a violation of law
iwhidh would operate as a fraud is a fraudulent practice. 87  The courts, however,
have given content to the statute by reading it to embrace not only legal fraud, but
also the omission or concealment of material facts which in fairness should be dis-
closed to the purchaser or seller of securities 88 Its purpose has been stated as being
not-only to prevent fraud, but to "defeat all unsubstantial and visionary schemes
. .- whereby the public is fraudulently exploited."'
"- This type of statute attempts no substantive regulation and is, in fact, an ineffective
'fraud-prevention weapon. Securities frauds frequently are not detected until it is too
late-to take preventive-measuresY0 Even where discovered, a full investigation is
isually necessary to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant prose-
cufioh. Then, there are the inevitable delays in bringing the case to trial-with the
possibility of appeal-not to mention the many legal hurdles to be surmounted in
establishing all of the elements of fraud.
On the other hand, if securities may be offered or sold only after qualification
under a registration or permit system, not only is there an opportunity for admin-
istrative review prior to sale, but the enforcement problems are reduced. Failure to
qualify the securities is -itself a violation. After apprehension of the violator,
any fraud aspects of the case may be pursued and prosecuted if the evidence is
'foithcoming. Prompt action may also enhance the likelihood of restitution to
victims.
81 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352 et seq.
8"See generally, Louis Loss, SEcursEs REGuLAT1ON 2o-26 (1951).
17People v. Federated Radio Corporation, 244 N.Y. 33, 38, X54 N.E. 655, 657 (1926).
.
8 5 Id, at 41, X54 N.E. at 658.
I01d. at 38, i54 N.E. at 657.
"See, e.g., People v. Tellier, 155 N.Y.S.2d 245 (S. Ct. x956). For the testimony of Attorney
General Javits, of New York, before a House subcommittee as to the futility of coping with the uranium
boom by a simple fraud statute, see Hearings before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on HR. 570Z, 84th Cong., 474-88 (1955-56).
These hearings also contain a case history of the role played by Mr. Tellier as a banker-promoter of
uranium companies. Id. at 561-95. Cf. People v. Otterman, 154 Cal. App. 2d 223, 3x6 P.2d 85 (1957).
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2. Broker-dealer registration
The second type of regulation is that of licensing the professional sellers of
securities.' Such statutes may require the registration of brokers and dealers and
their agents, 2 as well as registration of the agents of original issuers of securities.
Licensing of investment counsellors is a later development. Broker-dealer registra-
tion may be made an adjunct of fraud prevention-this has been done in New
YorkY3 It may also be used to buttress a system of securities qualification, as has
been done in the federal securities legislation and under a number of state blue-sky
laws. Secondary sales of securities are frequently controlled at the broker-dealer
level, rather than at the stage of original issueY4 But since these statutes are aimed
at dealers in securities rather than issuers, they play only a subsidiary role as instru-
ments of corporate regulation.
3. Securities qualification stressing disclosure
The third type is that of requiring securities to be registered or qualified, with a
view to preventing fraud by compelling full disclosure in a prospectus to be furnished
to the prospective purchaser prior to sale. The Securities Act of 1933, with some
exceptions, requires that new issues of securities offered by use of the mails or other
channels of intertstate commerce shall be registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and that a prospectus (filed as a part of the registration statement)
shall be furnished to the purchaser prior to the sale or, in some cases, at the time
of the delivery of the security after saleY5 According to the Commission,"6 its
... primary function is to require full and adequate disclosure of all material facts in con-
nection with a pubic offering of securities so that investors may, on the basis of such
disclosure, arrive at an informed judgment as to whether or not to purchase the securities
offered.
Civil liabilities are imposed upon the issuer and certain other persons for misstate-
ments or omissions contained in the registration statement and prospectus in favor
of purchasers of registered securitiesY7
The disclosure statutes are based upon the theory that once the facts are made ac-
*'See Louis Loss, SEcuruans REGuL oN 26-3o (195i).
"
5The loopholes in the federal and New York securities statutes have created enforcement difficulties.
See Hearings, supra note 90, at 477-79.
03 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 359-e. In New Jersey, regulation is retricted to a simple antifraud statute.
N.J. Rav. StAT. tit. 49 (1937).
" See e.g., CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 25602. See text at note 154 infra. In California, this solution has
been dictated in part by the decision in People v. Pace, 73 Cal. App. 548, 238 Pac. io89 (1925), which
found supposed constitutional restrictions against requiring a broker's license for sales by a bona fide in-
dividual of personally-owned securities of which he was neither issuer nor underwriter, where the sales
were for his own account and he did not engage in the business of dealing in securities. See Dahlquist,
Regulation and Civil Liability under the Californa Corporate Securities Act: li, 34 CA~iF. L. REv. 344,
363 (1946); IV, id. at 695, 719 (1946).
05 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (952).
"In the Matter of Tucker Corporation, Securities Act Release No. 3236, 1947, p. I.
" Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, and 15, 48 STAT. 82, 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. H3 77k, 771,
770 (1952); Louis Loss, SEcusMs REOuLATON 982-1o29 (1951).
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cessible to a prospective investor, then if he "does not take the trouble to inform him-
self before risking his money, he has no one to blame but himself." ' Despite the
apparent simplicity of this approach, numerous problems arise in administration.
First, under the Federal Securities Act, sales may be made in person or by telephone,
without the seller being required to furnish the buyer with a prospectus in advance,
as long as the prospectus accompanies or precedes any written confirmation of the
sale or, in the absence of such confirmation, accompanies or precedes delivery of the
security after the sale.P Many securities are, thus, sold under circumstances where,
for all practical purposes, the investor is committed before he ever sees the prospectus.
Under this loophole, full disclosure is illusory, since the sale can be made by oral
representations, and the prospectus serves only to inform the investor as to what he
has already purchased1 00 Moreover, even where the prospective purchaser does
receive the prospectus, it is at least doubtful whether he will take the time and
trouble to read it or whether any but the more sophisticated investors will under-
stand this complicated document.101 Nor can it be assumed that the information
will trickle down to the average investor through security analysts and financial ad-
visers, particularly in cases of promotional or highly speculative securities102 The
most important safeguard is the very careful administrative review to which the
Securities and Exchange Commission subjects registration statements and pro-
spectuses.
°0 3
The Commission prescribes the contents of the registration statement and pro-
spectus. In order to carry out the statutory policy, the Commission has interpreted
the requirement of full disclosure in very broad terms.'04 It compels compliance with
"Address by Louis Loss, Mexico Stock Exchange, June 6, 1957, at 8.
"Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 48 STAT. 77, as amended, x5 U.S.C. § 77e (1952).
... Byron D. Woodside, Director of the SEC Division of Corporation Finance, has said: "I think the
facts of life are such that the securities . . . in promotional ventures in the uranium field and mining
field generally, oil and gas and, indeed, in some of the other types of promotional issues, are sold on
the basis of oral representations which convince people they are going to realize a profit if they buy,
and I would guess in the vast majority of the cases, whether the issues . . . were registered, or not, as
a practical matter you would not be able to nail anybody under section is [of the Securities Act of 1933],
because I do not think that is where the misrepresentation is likely to be found. It is in the conversation
that occurs between the salesman and the purchaser, and the dealer and the purchaser." Hearings,
supra note 90, at 81. See Louis Loss, SEcaaRnaEs REGULAT ON 58-61 (Supp. 1955). The same opportu-
nity, of course, exists for all issues.
... C1. Cole, Morley, and Scott, Corporate Financing in Great Britain, 12 BusINEss LAWYER 321, 370,
371 (1957); Louis Loss, SacursaaEs REGULATION 158-6x, 165-66 (x955); Douglas, Protecting the In-
vestor, 23 YALE REV. (n.s.) 521, 523 (1934).
'' Cf. Louis Loss, SEcuirias REGULATON 166 (1951).
"' Id. at 16 6 -7 8 .
104 See Charles A. Howard, i S.E.C. 6, 11 (934) (a statement is false if it conveys a false im-
pression); Commonwealth Bond Corp., i S.E.C. 13, 24 (1934) (prophecies known to be untrue when
made are untrue statements of fact, since they misstate the mind of the prophet); National Educators
Mutual Ass'n, Inc., I S.E.C. 208, 215 (1935) (even though all statements are literally correct, the Com-
mission may challenge a registration statement and prospectus upon the broad basis that, taken as an
entirety, the general effect is to create a false impression in the minds of prospective investors); Plymouth
Consolidated Gold Mines, Ltd., i S.E.C. 139, 146 (1935) (where the effect of the share structure is to
permit promoters to siphon off most of the cash contributed by investors, there must be an "adequate
and succinct disclosure of the effects of these strange and curious proceedings to the investor"); Haddam
Distillers Corp., I S.E.C. 37, 47 (1934) (trusteeship of other people's money demands "some warrant
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its standards by advising the registrant of shortcomings through an informal "de-
ficiency letter" or by instituting refusal order or stop-order proceedings. 0 5 As Pro-
fessor Loss says: "While in theory the Commission's staff merely 'suggests' amend-
ments, the practicabilities of financing do not allow any real alternative of com-
plying."'106
Moreover, the Commission may also be in a position to impose some substantive
conditions by use of the coercive power to deny acceleration'07 The registration
statement becomes effective on the twentieth day following its filing or the filing of
any amendments thereto, and the time runs from the filing of each amendment.
The Commission may grant or deny acceleration "having due regard to the adequacy
of the information respecting the issuer theretofore available to the public, to the
facility with which the nature of the securities to be registered, their relationship to
the capital structure of the issuer and the rights of holders thereof can be under-
stood, and to the public interest and the protection of investors."'08 Where accelera-
tion is essential for business reasons, the language gives the Commission considerable
latitude to impose some substantive regulation which goes beyond mere disclosure,
as any lawyer who has been confronted with the use of this power can attest. And.
as Professor Davis point out, judicial review is impracticable, if not nonexistent.09
The acceleration weapon, however, is most effective when least required and is.
relatively impotent in cases of the greatest need. Acceleration is absolutely essential
only where the securities are of sufficient soundness that a responsible underwritef
is willing to give a firm commitment, if only for a limited period. The risks are too
great for these underwriters to court the disasters which may ensue from failure of
the Commission to grant acceleration. On the other hand, in the case of promotional
or more speculative ventures, there is not the same urgency, and the registrant is in a
position to wait out all efforts of the Commission to wear it down through asserting
deficiencies or through stop-order proceedings. Precisely this happened in the-
Tucker case, where the registrant even survived a stop-order proceeding and am
opinion of the Commission which was apparently for the purpose of "warning"
prospective investors." Although the road may be long and weary and entail much
of open, fair and careful dealing"); Consolidated Mines Syndicate, 2 S.E.C. 316, 323 (1937) (a write-up,
of assets without any basis in sound valuation is misleading).
" Louis Loss, SEcumrTEs RErULATION 172 (1951).
0
" Id. at 175. ... See id. at 175-78.
.. Securities Act of 1933, § 8(a), 48 STAT. 79, 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1952).
109 KENNETH C. DAVIs, ADrnmiNISmAvE LAw § 42 (1951).
.1. Securities Act Release, supra note 96 at 3. The public failed to understand or heed the warning.
Between X946 and 1948, the Tucker Corporation raised some $26,ooo,ooo in cash through the sale of
franchises, stock, and auto accessories, mostly through the sale of stock at five dollars a share. By-
1948, the company was bankrupt, and most of the investors' funds were lost. The registration statement
became effective despite the "suspicions" of the SEC, which considered itself helpless to do more under-
a disclosure statute. See Study of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. No. 2508, 82d Cong., 2d'
Sess. 18, 22-23, 24-29 (1952); Velie, The Fantastic Story of the Tucker Car, Collier's, June 25, 1949, p.
13. But the state blue-sky administrators were also unable to cope with this bizzarre episode. Only
California barred sale of the stock as "a fraud upon the purchasers," $3,ooo,ooo, or fifteen per cent of
the issue of $20,o0o,oo0, having been slated for sale in that state. See N.Y. Times, Aug. x, 1947, p. 28,.
col. 3; Velie, supra at 15, 71.
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time and expense, there is a very substantial number of issues which ultimately clear
the Commission under its standard of full disclosure, but cannot meet the more
exacting substantive standards imposed under the blue-sky laws of a number of
states. 11
The view is widely held that the securities regulation at the federal level should
be confined to the milder disclosure philosophy for a variety of reasons. Some be-
lieve that it would be unwise to give the Commission a broader power to pass upon
the "fairness" of securities issues, on the ground that this would give it "life-and-
death power over virtually the entire industry of the country ... ,,112 In view of the
sharp differences in attitude vis-a-vis regulation in various sections of the country,
there seems little likelihood in the near future of any expansion of the powers of the
SEC in this area. Moreover, any such change would be impracticable and unwieldy
without a far greater degree of administrative decentralization within the SEC than
now exists, for its success would depend upon administration at the grass roots rather
than from Washington.
A number of states, however, have experimented with securities statutes which do
impose a considerable measure of substantive regulation upon issuers, and it is
believed that these statutes hold the key to effective corporate regulation at the state
level.
4. Qualification of securities with varying degrees of substantive regulation
This type of securities statute places less reliance upon disclosure to prospective
investors and undertakes a greater degree of substantive regulation. These statutes
range from the milder Uniform Sale of Securities Act, adopted by the Commissioners
on Uniform Laws in i93o"ll and withdrawn in z943,ii4 and its successor, the new
Uniform Securities Act of I956,1"' to more far-reaching systems of securities regula-
tion, such as that found in the California Corporate Securities Law."0 At the risk
of overgeneralization, the essential difference in the new Uniform Securities Act
""
1 The statistics under the Illinois Securities Law of 1933 are illustrative.
1954 z955 z956
Applications filed s55 158 198
Applications withdrawn for failure to qualify 17 30 20
Applications withdrawn in Illinois
but registered with the SEC o 18 14
See ILL. SEcurRIEs DEP'T ANN. REP. 14-15 (954); id. at 16-x8 (1955); id. at 8-xo (1956). Fur-
thermore, it is the view of the Illinois Securities Department that these data do not tell the complete
story, since many issuers who have registered their securities under the Federal Securities Act "do not even
bother to file . . . [under the Illinois statute] because of the additional statutory safe-guards to the public
required by such Law." Id. at i5 (1954). Although the Illinois record may not be typical, since it is
generally regarded as a leading state in its blue-sky administration, the conclusion seems inescapable that
securities regulation in a number of states is far more effective than that of the SEC, especially with respect
to promotional ventures. See Hearings, supra note 9o, at 275-90, passim.
115 Address by Louis Loss, Mexico Stock Exchange, June 6, 1957, at 12. C". Joslin, Federal Securities
Regulation from the Small Investors' Perspective, 6 J. PuB. L. 219 (1957).
1159 U.L.A. 625 (1942).
114 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CoMM'Rs ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK 81 (1943).
" Louis Loss AND EnwA ,u CowErr, BLUE SKY LAW 245 (1958).
" CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-6104 •
RolE oF STATES
and the California statute is that the former concentrates upon fraud prevention (al-
though it goes somewhat further in this respect than the Federal Securities Act),
while the California statute may be regarded as an integral part of a broad scheme
for correcting some of the inequities and defects which may otherwise arise in the
practices of corporation finance. In order to compare this difference in approach,
a brief description of the California system is necessary.
a. The California Corporate Securities Law-a maximum regulation statute.
(i) Theory and scope. The California statute combines broker-dealer regula-
lation,1 7 fraud prevention,11  and disclosure' 9 with administrative supervision over
sales or issues of new securities in the state by an issuer; alteration of outstanding
securities through charter amendments;2 ° and exchanges of securities effected
through merger, consolidation, or voluntary recapitalization.'
2
'
This pattern of regulation stems from a number of key provisions. With minor
exceptions not of general application, no company may sell or offer for sale any
security of its own issue in the state until it has applied for and secured a permit
from the Corporation Commissioner authorizing the transaction' 22  Every security
of its own issue sold or issued by a company without such a permit is void, as are
securities sold or issued in nonconformity with any provision of a permit which
has been previously obtained' 2 3
A "sale" is defined not only to include offers and dispositions of securities for
value, but also exchanges of securities and "any change in the rights, preferences,
privileges, or restrictions on outstanding securities,"'2 4 thereby sweeping within its
ambit all such changes effected by direct charter amendment, merger, consolidation,
and voluntary recapitalizationsY2 5 Since the statute applies to issues as well as sales,
117Id. §§ 25700-13.
"'Id. §§ 25507, 261o4(e). There is, however, no specific section prescribing civil liability for viola-
tions of the statute. See Dahiquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate
Securities Act: III, 34 CALIF. L. REv. 543 (1946). Other articles in this series written by this leading
member of the California corporate bar are found at: 33 id. at 343 (1945); 34 id. at 344 (1946);
and id. at 695.
1. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25600-04.
"' Id. § 25009(a).
121 Id. § 25510. The statute establishes a Division of Corporations, the administrative head of which
is the Commissioner of Corporations. According to information received from the Commissioner, the
Division has approximately 14o employees, as compared with a total SEC personnel of 784, of whom
484 are located in Washington, D.C., and only 300 in the field. See SEC ANN. REP. x97 (957). The
Division maintains offices in Los Angeles, Sacramento, and San Francisco. Over the years, fees have been
adjusted with a view to meeting all costs of administering the statute, including enforcement activities. As
a result of increased business activity in recent years, however, receipts from fees have exceeded the
amounts appropriated for support of the agency. CALIF. SraE BUDGET, JULY 1, 1958-JuNE 30, 1959, at
518. A prominent member of the California corporate bar has called it "one of the model statewide
regulatory agencies." Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities
Act, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 343 (1945). Cf. Armstrong, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REv. 713, 720 (1958).
12 CAL. Coin. CODE § 25500.
122 1d. § 261oo. For judicial modification of the "void" rule, see Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil
Liability Under the California Corporate Securities Act: III, 34 CALIF. L. REv. 543, 551-6o (1946); Louis
Loss, S~cuaurrEs REOuLAToN 962-64 (1951).
""' CAL. CoRn'. CODE § 25oo9(a).
.
1 See also id. § 25510.
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a permit is required even for the issuance of a share dividend. 12 Stock splits also
require a permit'
27
The theory is that every issue of securities offers an opportunity to create in-
equities among shareholders and that any general exemption would fail to give the
protection which the minority or outside shareholders need. It is possible, for
example, to shift voting power between classes of shares by means of a stock split,
a reverse stock split, or a share dividend. Moreover, a share dividend of preferred
on common might have the effect of diluting the interest of the preferred as regards
dividends, redemption, liquidation, conversion, and other rights. Shifts in priorities
may also be effected through share dividends. Accordingly, rather than relying upon
the class or other voting provision in the general corporation statute of the state, the
Commissioner is vested with the power to review these transactions as to fairness.
While, at first glance, these provisions may seem unduly to hamper legitimate busi-
ness, experience has shown that enough cases arise where supervision is needed
to justify the inconvenience.
The statute' and the rules and regulations1" prescribe the contents of the
application, the purpose of which (with the accompanying exhibits) is to furnish the
Commission with material information necessary to appraise such matters as the
nature of the business to be conducted, qualifications of the proposed management,
whether the venture will be adequately capitalized, amounts of promotion securities
proposed to be issued compared to funds from outside investors, proposed selling
expenses, possible inequities between classes of shares, and whether the reports of
engineers, appraisers, or other experts are adequate. The application is not a registra-
tion statement or a prospectus which is to be furnished to prospective purchasers as a
selling document; it is prepared for the use of the Commissioner in determining
whether a permit should be granted or denied. Accordingly, the document is much
simpler than a registration statement or prospectus and less costly to prepare' 8
The greatest departure from concepts of fraud prevention and disclosure, however,
are to be found in the standards prescribed by the Commissioner for authorizing
and denying permits. On original issues of securities, the Commissioner is to issue
a permit only if he finds "that the proposed plan of business . .. and the proposed
issuance of the securities are fair, just, and equitable, that the applicant intends to
transact its business fairly and honestly," and that the securities proposed to be
issued and the methods of issuing and disposing of them "are not such as, in his
12 See Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities Act, 33
CALiF. L. REV. 343, 351 (1945)-
"Ibid. For the controversy whether the "sale" of treasury shares is an "issue" of a new security,
see Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities Act: II, 34 id. nt
344, 374, 379 (946); Ballantine, The Curious Fiction of Treasury Shares, id. at 536.
... Cs. COP. CODE §§ 25502-05.
... CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 1o, c. 3, subc. 2, § 318-32. These rules and regulations are reprinted
in i CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 8611-51 (1954).
.8. The cost of compliance with state and federal securities regulation is especially acute for small
business. See Murphy, The Big Worry of Small Business: Money, Fortune, July 1957, pp. 120, 122, 123;
Louis Loss, SEcuRns REan-l OLrNo 400-03 (i95i); id. at 400-01 (Supp. x955).
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opinion, will work a fraud upon the purchaser"; otherwise, he shall deny the applica-
tion, refuse the permit, and notify the applicant in writing of his decision. 3 ' In
cases of issues of securities in exchange for outstanding securities, claims, and other
property interests, including cash, pursuant to a merger, consolidation, or voluntary
recapitalization, application for approval must be made to the Commissioner, who is
authorized to approve the terms and conditions of the exchange, after a hearing on
the fairness, at which all persons to whom it is proposed to issue such securities may
appear. After the hearing, the Commissioner may refuse the permit "if in his opinion
the plan is not fair, just, or equitable to all security holders affected' 3 Thus, all
issues are subjected to the litmus test of fairness to the entirety of the security holders
affected'
(2) Function and contents of the permit. Unlike the Federal Securities Act and
other registration statutes, the Commissioner does not "register" the securities by
making an order to that effect or by entering the securities in a register;' 4 he issues,
instead, a written permit to the applicant authorizing the issue or sale of the securi-
ties. The permit generally contains: (i) recitals which are somewhat comparable to
a summary prospectus; (2) the authority to issue or sell the securities, setting forth
the price, maximum selling expense (including commissions), the methods and terms
of payment, and the purpose to which the proceeds shall be applied; and (3) the
conditions imposed in the permit, if necessary, to make the proposed issue of securi-
ties "fair, just, and equitable"' 3 "
The conditions are most commonly imposed in connection with promotional
and highly speculative ventures.'" First, the amount of "promotional shares" which
may be issued is limited and may not exceed an ultimate right to participate in divi-
dends and assets of more than fifty per cent 37 Promotion shares include con-
temporaneous sales of "cheap stock" to promoters and underwriters at a price sub-
stantially below the public offering price, as well as prior sales of such stock, unless
a change of conditions since the time of issuance justifies the differential between
the price of the earlier sale and the current offering price to the public' a They also
.a CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25507.
"'Id. § 25510. (Emphasis added.). For an evaluation of the California system as compared to
judicial control, see Orschel, Administrative Protection for Shareholders in California Recapitalizations, 4
STAN. L. REv. 215 (952). And see Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California
Corporate Securities Act: 1i, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 344, 35o-62 (1946).
... See, e.g., In the Matter of Richardson Corporation, Cal. Corp. Comm'r. File No. SF 622275, SF
31266 0948), discussed in Orschel, supra note 132, at 223. In determining that a statutory merger
was not "fair" to all of the security holders affected, the Commissioner took cognizance of the fact that
the vote of preferred shareholders included the vote of controlling persons with an adverse interest. See
SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVEsTIGATION OF TnE WoRx, Ac'rsvrsS, PERSONNEL, AND FUNCrIONS
OF PEo'rEc-rvE AND REORGANIZATION CoaMr IrEEs Pt. 7, at 148-87 (938); cf. Gibson, supra note 29, at
621.
... Cf. UNIFORM SALE OF SEcuRITIEs AcT OF 1930, § 8, 9 U.L.A. 625, 641 (1942); UNIFORM
SEcutrrEs AcT § 304(c), Louis Loss AND EDWARD CoWETr, BLUE SKY LAW 305 (1958).
1"CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25507-09.
... See generally CA.. AnM. CODE tit. 10, c. 3, subc. 2, §§ 368-421.
18tld. H§ 368.2, 368.6.
its Id. § 368.
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embrace shares issued for past services or for intangible assets of unproven value
because of the absence of an established earnings record18 Second, promotion
shares are ordinarily limited to common shares, as to which a number of conditions
are imposed in the permit. If the promotion shares may, as a class, elect a majority
of the board of directors, a condition is imposed that the voting right as a class
terminates if the company fails to pay an annual dividend of at least five per cent
on its outstanding shares (exclusive of promotion shares) for two years, whether
or not consecutive. 40 They must carry a waiver of dividend rights (currently five
per cent) until the shareholders who have paid cash or its equivalent receive such
a dividend, which is cumulative, after which the promotion shares receive a similar
dividend; thereafter, all shares participate ratably.' 4' The right to participate in
assets upon liquidation is also waived until the shareholders who have paid cash or
its equivalent receive back their investment.142 Third, a new company financing
by a public offering of securities may be compelled to impound a minimum amount
of proceeds deemed necessary to launch the enterprise until the specified amount is
raised."' Finally, to prevent the promoters from "bailing out" by selling their
stock and walking off from the enterprise while it is still in the promotional stage,
promotion shares must be placed in escrow with an escrow holder approved by the
Commissioner, and transfers are allowed only with his permission 44
Other conditions may be imposed where vitally necessary to make the securities
"fair, just, and equitable." For example, selling expenses are limited to twenty per
cent of the selling price. They include indirect forms of compensation to promoters
and underwriters, such as stock options, warrants, and other forms of "banditry"
which would permit the siphoning off of an excessive amount of profits if the
venture should prove successful.' 45 The price to the public may itself be limited
where the ratio of the proposed offering price to past earnings is unreasonably
excessive 46
(3) Scope of exemptions. The California statute follows the usual pattern of
exempting certain securities and certain transactions, irrespective of the type of
security, but the nature and scope of these exemptions are more limited than is
customary in two important respects. First, there is no exemption of new issues of
securities simply because they have been previously listed upon a national securities
exchange. The theory is that merely listing a security for trading confers no badge
19 Ibid.
"" Id. 3 368.5, 373. The regulations are silent as to whether any right of reinstatement exists.





1 42 1d. §3 349-56.
x"Jd. § 337-45 The Commissioner will grant exceptions to his rules on application for a closed
permit, where the prospective purchasers are informed investors, if all shares are escrowed so that sub-
sequent sales need his consent. See HENRY V. BALLANTINE AND GRAHAM L. STERLING, JR., CALIFORNIA
CORPORATION LAWS § 461 (1949)-
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entitling it to immunity from regulation. The Great Sweet Grass swindle,'47 in-
volving a security listed on the American Stock Exchange, is a recent classic example
which proves the point. We live in an age of mergers, where shifts of control may
take place quickly through such devices as a negotiated purchase, a sale of assets, a
merger, or a stock acquisition.' 48  Moreover, any such exemption would cut down
the Commissioner's power to review voluntary recapitalizations, mergers, and consoli-
dations for "fairness."
Second, the California statute rejects the idea of a small issues exemption of
corporate securities, based upon private offers, amount of securities, or the number
of offers or sales, the theory being that such exemptibns are neither necessary nor
advisable.' 4 A "private-offering" exemption when applied to corporate securities
has proved to be much too vague and susceptible of evasion?' ° Accordingly, in
California, such offerings are screened by the Commissioner. In the case of a pro-
posed private offering, an application may be made for a closed permit authorizing
the sale of securities to a selected group of persons. 5 ' If the Commissioner is
satisfied that the members of the group are reasonably informed investors, a closed
permit is issued, authorizing the sale of a maximum amount of securities to any
or all such persons. If a public offering is involved, the proper procedure is to
request an open permit to make offers to the public indiscriminately.
The Commissioner's files reveal many reasons why an exemption based upon
the number of offerees or volume of sales is rejected. For example, in one case,
a California school teacher was induced to invest her life savings of $8o,ooo in a
Texas insurance annuity promotion. 52 To exempt any such offer or sale would
simply open up another avenue of escape from effective regulation and thus en-
courage fraud. Furthermore, a real danger exists that additional corporations might
" In the Matter of Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd. and Kroy Oils Ltd., Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 5483, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 76,516 (957); Klaw, The Great Sweet Grass Swindle, Fortune,
Aug. 1957, p. X34.
... The mechanics of the Great Sweet Grass swindle revolved around an acquisition of control of
a Canadian corporation by a Canadian promoter for an expenditure of $150,000. The corporation's shares
were listed on the American Stock Exchange. The corporation, through a series of "mergers," subse-
quently issued, in Canada, some 2,8oo,ooo shares, which were resold in the United States without SEC
registration under a claim of exemption by virtue of SEC Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (Supp. 1957).
The returns to the promoters were approximately as follows: gross returns, $13,000,000; cost of shares
to promoters, $3,500,000; commissions to boiler-room operators, $2,0oo,ooo; net profit to promoters,
$7,500,000. See Klaw, supra note 147, at 178.
... Domestic & Foreign Pet. Co. v. Long, 4 Cal. 2d 547, 51 P.2d 73 (1935); Cecil B. DeMille Pro-
ductions v. NVoolery, 61 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1932).
See In re The Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release No. 3825, CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. 76,539 (1957); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. ssg (1953). On the difficulties in the SEC
enforcement program, see 23 SEC ANN. RlP. 1-9 (1957).
'"See Domestic & Foreign Pet. Co. v. Long, 4 Cal.2d 547, 51 P.2d 45 (9 th Cir. 1932); Dahlquist,
Regulation and Civil Liability Vnder the California Corporate Securities Act, 33 CALF. L. REv. 343,
359 (1945).
... Cal. Corp. Comm'r File No. SF K.P. Chartier (Alpha) (1955). The offer was made in California
without a permit. Full restitution was eventually obtained. Compare the enforcement difficulties
engendered by the "isolated sale" and "sale to stockholder" exemptions found in the Florida statute.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.o6(3) and (4) (Supp. 1957), discussed in Robinton and Sowards, The Florida
Securities Act: A Re-Examination, 12 MiAmi L. Q. 1, 4-5 (1957).
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be proliferated merely to take advantage of any such exemption. In view of these
possibilities, it seems unrealistic to rest an exemption either upon the number of
offerees or upon the volume of sales. The legislative policy appears to be based
upon* the theory that the closed permit procedure provides a safety valve for small
issues, without unduly hampering legitimate business or releasing most of the steam
from the Commissioner's enforcement machinery in this area.
(4) The problem of the foreign issuer. A necessary step in preparing a nation-
wide distribution of securities is that of coordinating the SEC registration with
the blue-skying at the state level. Under the California statute, a permit to issue or
sell securities must be obtained if the issuer is a California corporation, regardless
of where the sale or issue takes place153 Suppose, however, X, a Delaware corpora-
tion, with its principal place of business in New York and with numerous share-
holders residing throughout the United States, including California, proposes to
market an issue of securities on a national basis. The securities will be under-
written under a firm commitment, and the underwriters will resell the securities
either directly or through selected dealers. The shares will be registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The closing will take place in New York,
and the shares will be resold in California by licensed California brokers and dealers.
Since a secondary rather than a primary sale in California is entailed, no applica-
tion for a permit for the corporation to issue or sell the securities is necessary; the
only general requirement under the statute is that advertising literature to be used in
California by brokers or dealers be filed with the Commission at least one day
prior to use.'5 4 The usual practice is for one of the principal underwriters who is a
registered California dealer to file the prospectus and other advertising and selling
material with the Commissioner shortly after filing the registration statement with
the SEC. If the securities and the terms of sale meet the Commissioner's standards,
the underwriters are advised that the material may be used upon supplying any
missing data, such as the price. Frequently, the dealer furnishes this information
by telegram. On the other hand, if the Commissioner, after a review of the pro-
spectus, finds that the sale of the security would be "unfair, unjust, and inequitable,"
he may notify brokers and dealers to that effect in writing, and sales in California
are thereafter forbidden until the Commissioner subsequently withdraws his ob-
jection.155
The practical result is that most national issues of foreign issuers registered with
' 'See Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities Act: 11,
34 CAL'i'. L. REV. 344, 384 (1946). When the articles of incorporation of a California corporation are
filed with the Secretary of State, he gives notice of this requirement. And see CAL. COR. CODE § 413




'CAL. COR'. CODE § 25602; CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 10, c. 3, subc. 2, §§ 84o-842; see Dahlquist,
Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities Act: 11, 34 CALiP. L. REV. 344,
380-84 (1946).
.. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25707. It is this rather obscure section which plugs a supposed loophole
which Professor Loss has noted in the California statute with respect to the secondary sale of securities.
See Louss Loss AND EDWARD CowTrr, BLUE SKY LAW 204 (1958).
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the SEC and sold under a firm commitment to responsible underwriters for resale
in California can be processed without delay or difficulty. Problems will arise
only where the issue fails to meet the Commissioner's substantive standards. If the
securities are to be sold under a "best efforts" arrangement rather than a firm com-
mitment, the Commissioner regards the underwriter as an agent of the issuer and
the corporation itself must file an application for a permit.156
In case the X Corporation offers securities to its California shareholders, whether
pursuant to a rights offering or an exchange offer to be made in connection with a
voluntary recapitalization, merger, or consolidation, a permit must be obtained from
the Corporation Commissioner, since a "sale" takes place in the state.'57 It has also
been seen that the statute embraces "issues" as well as "sales," so that even the
issuance of a stock dividend to California shareholders requires a permit. The
California Attorney General has ruled, however, that a foreign corporation doing
no business in California may issue a true stock dividend to California shareholders
without the necessity of a permit. 58 Thus, suppose that a Massachusetts corpora-
tion not doing business in California issues all of its shares to residents of Massachu-
setts. Later, a single shareholder moves to California. Under the Attorney General's
ruling, no permit would be required to issue to him a stock dividend. Although
the question is unresolved, it is believed that a contrary result would be reached
if the foreign corporation were engaged in business, or maintained a commercial
domicile, in California.5 9 Various interested groups have so far been unable to
agree on a formula to take care of the problem of the foreign issuer with an in-
substantial number of California shareholders. It would seem feasible, however, to
give the Commissioner statutory power to issue rules and regulations exempting
some of these transactions, either by general rule or by order upon simple notification,
if he finds that the enforcement of the statute with respect to such transactions is not
necessary in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 60
The broad control over foreign issuers found in the California statute has one final
value. It enables the Commissioner to impose minimum standards for securities
upon foreign corporations who choose to issue or sell securities in California. He
has always used this power sparingly. For example, although mandatory cumula-
" See Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities Act: 11, 34
CALIF. L. REV. 344, 383 (1946).
"' Professor Loss suggests that a failure to exempt an offering by a foreign issuer to existing share-
holders pursuant to pre-emptive rights may be unconstitutional under the commerce clause. Louis Loss
AND EDwAm CowE-r, BLUE SKY LAW 377 (1958). As regards foreign issuers not doing business in the
state, it would seem that primarily due process considerations are involved and that these are probably in-
substantial. Cf. Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1949); McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
... Op. Cal. Att'y Gen., Oct. 8, 1929; cf. 17 Oss. CAL. A7r'y GEN. 217, 222, 223 (195); Louis Loss
AND EDWAnD CowEarr, BLUE-SKY LAw 204 (958). For conflict-of-laws problems, see the excellent article
of Loss, The Conflict of Laws and the Blue Sky Laws, 71 HARv. L. REV. 209 (1957), reprinted in Loss
AND Cowr-r, op. cit. supra c. 5.
... See Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities Act: II, 34
CALIF. L. REV. 344, 385 (1946).
Cf. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(b), 48 STAT. 75, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1952).
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tive voting has been a state policy for domestic corporations since 1879,"1' foreign
or quasi-foreign corporations have not been compelled to insert a cumulative voting
clause in their articles of incorporation where cumulative voting is permitted but not
required by the state of incorporation. In October 1956, however, Western Airlines,
Inc., a Delaware corporation, sought to amend its certificate of incorporation to
eliminate cumulative voting. 6 2  The company operates airlines in twelve western
states, but none in Delaware. a3 Its shares are owned by some 7,000 shareholders
residing in every state in the Union and in several foreign countries, but its principal
headquarters are located in California and it has many California shareholders. 1 4
At the time of the sale and issuance of its shares to California residents pursuant to
a permit from the Corporation Commissioner, the Company's certificate of incorpora-
tion allowed cumulative voting for directors. At the annual meeting of stockholders,
held in April i956, a group opposing the management elected two of the corpora-
tion's thirteen directors by the use of cumulative voting. Steps by the management
to eliminate that right followed. The proposed amendment was approved at a
special meeting at which approximately eighty-seven per cent of the shares voted,
fifty-nine per cent voting for and twenty-eight per cent voting against the amend-
ment. In view of this substantial opposition, 65 early in 1957, the California Corpora-
tion Commissioner twice denied the company's application for a permit to change
the rights of the outstanding shares in this respect, the theory apparently being
that such modification would be unfair and inequitable to those California share-
holders who might, by cumulating their votes, obtain representation on the board.
A petition by the company to the Los Angeles Superior Court resulted in referring
the matter back to the Commissioner for another hearing, and the matter is still
pending. If the Commissioner's position is sustained, it will clear up existing
doubts as to the power of the Commissioner to impose reasonable conditions upon
foreign corporations who choose to market their securities in California and to
supervise voluntary reorganizations, recapitalizations, and mergers. It will also
point the way for a state to use a securities statute as a regulatory device to prevent
the circumvention of its general corporation statute by out-of-state incorporation. 60
b. The Uniform Securities Act-a "mild" regulation statute. The new Uniform
Securities Act is the third attempt to achieve uniformity in the area of state securities
regulation. In 193o, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Bar Association approved a Uniform Sale of Securities
1"1 CAL. CONsT. art. xii, § 12 (1879), formerly made cumulative voting for directors mandatory.
Wright v. Cent. Cal. C. W. Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885). Although this section was repealed in
1930, the right was preserved by statute. CAL. CoRP'. CODE § 2235.
..
2 See WSTMRN AIRLINES, INC., ANN. REP. 6 (1956).
1. See WALsxc's MANuA. OF PAcIFic CoAsr SECURITIES 463 (1957).
... Id. at 464; WESTERN AIRLINES, INC., ANN. REP. 6 (x956).
106See WEsRN AIRLINES, INC., ANN. REP. 6 (956); Cal. Corp. Comm'r File No. SF 4053 (x956).
1.0 The Chairman of the ABA Committee on Corporation Laws finds this statutory solution "ridiculous"
and suggests a hard "sell" by corporations to eradicate it. Seward, supra note 68, at 34.
Act.'1" The Act was not an outstanding success, 168 and in 1943 it was dropped
from the list of Uniform Acts' 6
In 1947, a second effort was made by the same agencies, working through a joint
committee of practicing lawyers composed of members of the Conference Section
and the Committee on State Security Laws and Regulations of the American Bar
Association Section on Corporation, Banking, and Mercantile Law.'7 ' This commit-
tee prepared three tentative drafts of a Uniform Securities Act,17' but a hopeless dead-
lock ensued between industry representatives and some blue-sky lawyers, on the one
hand, who took the view that the draftsmen were too regulation-minded, and state
securities administrators, who were convinced that the movement was designed to
strip the regulators of their essential powers 72  In view of this impasse, the third
draft was withdrawn at the 1953 meeting of the National Conference, and it was
recommended that a "thorough background study" should be made and coopera-
tion sought from the National Association of Securities Administrators 73
107 UNIFORu SALE OF SacuTIuEs Act OF 1930, 9 U.L.A. (942).
"' The Act was adopted with modifications in Florida (I931), Hawaii ('93'), South Carolina
(1937), Oregon (1939), and Louisiana (1940). 9 U.L.A. 289 (Supp. 1950).
... Supra note 114.
170 72 A.B.A. REP. 98 (947). For an account of the work of this committee, see Blair-Smith, More
on the Project for a Uniform Securities A4ct, Business Lawyer, July 1956, p. ill.
"" These drafts (949, i951, and 1953) apparently were published in mimeograph form. Only the
last two drafts have been available to the writer. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, UNIFoRM SEcUrITIES Acr (2d tentative draft 1951); id. (3d tentative draft 1953); Blair-
Smith, supra note 170, at 112.
... See Blair-Smith, supra note 17o, at 112.
'
7 5 d. at 113. How the deadlock was broken is somewhat obscure, but it undoubtedly hinged upon
the decision to prepare a tripartite act representing the three different approaches to state securities regula-
tion. See note 178 infra.
The source of the three-part structure is less puzzling. Mr. Murray Hanson, general counsel of the
Investment Bankers Association of America, in 1947 suggested two uniform acts-one of the "fraud"
type and one of the "dealer-registration" type, "so that basically there would be a model law available
of whichever of the current types the people of a given state might desire." Hanson, The Need for
Uniformity in Our Securities Laws, in NAT'L Ass'N OF SECURITIES ADm'RS, PROCEEDINGS 55 (r947), re-
printed in 166 Cost. & FIN. CHR N. 1420 (i947). In 1951, Professor Loss picked up the ball, but sug-
gested the possibility of "three new acts, one for each of the three types of states," as he had then
classified them. Louis Loss, SEcuaRIEs REoULATION 45 (1951).
Professor Loss has also shed light on the deadlock-breaking episode at the 1953 meeting of the
National Conference: "The 1953 meeting of the Conference was held in Boston, and Commissioner
Edward L. Schwartz of the Boston Bar, Chairman of the Conference's Subcommittee on the Uniform
Securities Act, invited me to attend the meeting of the parent section of the Conference. That section
disapproved the third draft--and was about to recommend to the Conference that the entire idea of a
uniform or model securities statute be dropped-on the ground that the legislative philosophies of the
states were too diverse. But the members reconsidered when it was suggested that a model statute might
be drafted in several parts, each corresponding to one of the basic regulatory philosophies. Thus, Part
I might deal with fraud, Part II with broker-dealer registration and Part III with securities registration.
Then a fourth part might contain the general provisions (definitions, exemptions, rule-making powers and
so on) which would be essential under any of the philosophies. Under this scheme of things a state like
New Jersey which wanted to continue with a pure "fraud" philosophy might adopt only Parts I and
IV; a state like Pennsylvania which wanted to combine anti-fraud provisions with a system of broker-
dealer registration might adopt Parts I, II, and IV; and most of the states, which follow all three philoso-
phies, might consider the entire statute. This basic approach-I wish I could say it were my own,
but it has a rather mixed paternity-was received with some enthusiasm, and the Conference's commit-
tee was instructed to prepare a fourth draft accordingly." NAT'L ASS'N OF SEcusRTE AD%'S, PROCEDINGS
37 (954).
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The upshot was that in July 1954, the Harvard Law School undertook such a study
under the direction of Professor Louis Loss, assisted by Mr. Edward M. Cowett.1 4
A proposed Uniform Securities Act with final draft and commentary was published
two years later.' 75 The prestige of the Harvard Law School and the eminence of
Professor Loss in the field of federal securities regulation give the study a special
significance, and it is likely to have a wide influence upon state securities legislation
in the coming years.' 76  It seems unnecessary to praise the many good features of
the new Act, including the ingenious statutory proposal for solving the conflict-of-
laws problems in the regulation of interstate sales of securities.' 7 7  The policy
questions in any such proposal, however, are of such paramount importance that
it seems appropriate and permissible to attempt a critical analysis of the basic pro-
visions which have been framed to displace existing state legislation.
(i) Theory and scope. A unique feature of the new Act is that it rejects the
idea of complete uniformity in favor of what is essentially a three-part structure
representing the three basic approaches to regulation: (i) fraud prevention, (2)
broker-dealer regulation, and (3) registration or qualification of securities where
an administrator has the specific duty to examine the securities and the power to
exclude securities which fail to meet the state's minimum standards. The theory
is that although a state may adopt only one or a combination of these regulatory
schemes, if the Act should receive widespread acceptance, there will at least be
uniformity within any particular system.'
78
The quest for uniformity seems to have resulted from the "needless complexities"
of the state securities statutes.1' Professor Loss has said: "This welter of diverse state
laws make one almost literally scream for a uniform act--especially if he happens
to be preparing an issue for nationwide distribution."' Some law office juniors
who are responsible for blue-skying a nation-wide offering and coordinating it with
an SEC registration may be surprised to learn that the accomplishment of this
objective "has some of the aspects of a minor miracle.:'18 1  Since the fraud-type
statutes pose no problems from the standpoint of uniformity and broker-dealer regu-
lation offers problems of only minor significance, it is apparent that efforts at cor-
'17 Ibid. For further background, see Loss and Cowctt, An Interim Report on the Harvard Law
School Study of State Securities Regulation, Business Lawyer, Jan. 1955, p. 15, passim; Loss, Current
Status of the Uniform Securities Act, X2 id. at 26 (1956).
:t Louis Loss AND EDwAu CowETa, A PaoposwD UNIFORM SECURITIEs Ae-FNAL DnAFT AND
CoMMENTARY (1956). See note 3, supra. The new Uniform Securities Act will hereinafter be cited as
the UNIFoRm Sacuiun s Acrx956.
7' The Uniform Securities Act-1956 has been adopted with modifications in Kansas (1957) and
Hawaii (957). Virginia patterned its x956 statute upon an earlier draft. Seven other states have
adopted one or more sections of the Act. See Louis Loss AND EDwARD CowErr, BLUE SKY LAw app. II
(958).
... UNIFOR- SEcursrais Aar-1956, § 414. See Loss, The Conflct of.Laws and the Blue Sky Laws,
71 H-v. L. Rav. 209 (1957), reprinted in Louis Loss AND EDWARD Cowa-rr, BLUE SKY LAW c. 5 (1958).
""Louis Loss AN" EvwAD CowE-ar, BLuE SKY LAw 236-38 (1958).
'1' Loss and Cowett, An Interim Report on the Harvard Law School Study of State Securities Regula-
tion, Business Lawyer, Jan. 1955, p. X5.
"0 Louis Loss, SacuuRains REGULtArO 44 (i95r).
181 Address by Louis Loss, Mexico Stock Exchange, June 6, 1957, at 7.
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rective measures through the medium of uniformity would have to center upon
the provisions relating to registration of securities' 8 2
The system for registration of securities follows the pattern established in the
earlier Uniform Acts. As in the 193o and 1953 drafts, securities may be registered
by notification... and by qualification.' 8 4 They may, however, also be registered by
coordination, a new concept developed to correlate state securities registration with
registration under the Federal Securities Act of 1933P s5
The simple notification procedure is available to companies which have been in
existence for at least five years and which for the preceding three years have not de-
faulted on any senior security and have had average earnings of at least five per cent
on the common shares.'86 This procedure may be used irrespective of any changes
in management or other conditions which may make the statutory tests unreliable.
Registration by notification becomes effective two full business days after the filing
of a statement or an amendment, in the absence of a stop order proceeding or the
order itself.'8 7
Under the coordination method, the registration statement filed under the Federal
Securities Act of 1933 may be used to effect state registration for the same offering'88
One objective of the coordination procedure is to streamline compliance with the
state statute "without sacrificing the traditional regulatory philosophy of the states to
the disclosure philosophy of the federal statute.""8 9 Another is to avoid "a mad last-
minute mass of telephone calls and telegrams in order to make certain that the issue
is cleared with the states by the time the registration statement becomes effective at
the SEC."'90  These purposes are accomplished by making the state registration
statement operative at the moment the federal registration statement becomes
effective, if (i) no stop order has been issued; (2) the registration statement has
been on file with the state administrator for ten days; and (3) a statement of the
"2 See Blair-Smith, supra note 17o, at 1:2. James E. Dunlap, of the Los Angeles bar, has pointed
out that "most of the pressure for the uniform law [Uniform Securities Act-956] has come from the
large brokerage houses and their attorneys who are well acquainted with the laws of all 48 states."
Dunlap, Uniformity Achieved by Proposed Uniform Securities Act, in Los ANGELES BAR Ass'N COMM. ON
CoRpo'uAToNs app., at 1 (1957).
8 3 UNIFOIM SALE OF SECuRmES AcT OF 1930 § 7, 9 U.L.A. 635 (1942); UNIFORM SEcumrnEs
AcT § 4-1 (3d tentative draft x953) (called registration by description).
18LUNIFORM SALE OF SECURITIEs ACT OF 1930, § 8, 9 U.L.A. 643 (1942); UNIFORM SacuuunES Acr
§ 5-r (3 d tentative draft 1953).
"" Cf. Smith, supra note 84, at 252-55; Wright, supra note 84; Louis Loss, SECURITES REGULATION
44-88 (95).
2" UNIFORM SE CuRITIFs Acr-r956, § 302.1 87 Id. § 302(C).18 8 Id. § 303.
18" Louis Loss AND EDWARD, Cowrr, BLuE SKY LAW 291 (X958). (Emphasis by authors.)
Ibid. It is believed that Professor Loss greatly exaggerates the mechanical problem. While time,
paper work, and telephone and telegraph expenses are necessary to blue-sky a nationwide issue, when
weighed against the other tasks of the lawyer in getting out the issue, they are of minor magnitude. Cf.
Dean, The Lawyer's Problems in the Registration of Securities, 4 LAW & CoNrEm. PROB. 154, 176
(1937). And the State Securities Administrators have done much to improve the situation. Louis Loss
AND EDwAa Cowar, BLuE SKY LAw 230-33 (1958). The question is not whether there should be more
coordination, but how it should be achieved without emasculating state securities regulation.
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maximum and minimum proposed offering prices and the maximum underwriting
discounts have been on file for two full business days.'' If the registrant advises
the administrator of the date when the federal registration statement is expected to
become effective, the administrator must promptly advise the registrant by telephone
or telegraph, at the registrant's expense, whether all the conditions are satisfied and
whether he then contemplates the institution of a stop order proceeding to deny,
suspend, or revoke effectiveness under the Act.02 The coordination procedure
closely approximates the California procedure as to secondary sales, except that under
the Uniform Act (as we shall see later), the administrator has only a very limited
power to deny registration to an issue where SEC clearance has been obtained.
The third method of registration is by qualification. The information required
to be filed is modeled on schedule A of the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and SEC
Form S-i.'0 3
The administrator may, by rule or order, require as a condition to registration
by qualification or by coordination that certain promotion shares be escrowed.1 4
These are limited to' shares issued within three years or which are to be issued to a
promoter for a consideration substantially different from the public offering price,
as well as securities issued to any person for a noncash consideration. The three-
year limitation opens the way for evasion by bankers and promoters who can keep
corporate shells with outstanding promotion shares "on ice" for the requisite
period.' 95 The administrator may also require that the proceeds from the sale of a
registered security be impounded until a specified amount is received.'00 It is to be
noted, however, that the escrow and impound provisions do not require that
promotion shares be subordinated to the outside shares in the event of liquidation-
an ingredient of the i93o Act-and are not made applicable to securities registered
by notification. While the latter exception would not ordinarily be important, situ-
tions may arise where, as a result of a change in the character of the business or
otherwise, such registrants are, in fact, issuing promotional securities which should be
subordinated.
The crucial section of the new Act is section 306, which specifies the conditions
under which the administrator may deny effectiveness to, or suspend, or revoke the
effectiveness of a registration statement filed under any one of the three procedures
-notification, coordination, or qualification. The Commissioner may issue any
such order if he finds that it would be in the public interest to do so and that any
10 UNIFORM SEcuitrTES AcT-1956, § 303(C).
102 Ibid.
...1d. § 30 4 (b); Louis Loss AND EDWARD CowETr, BLUE Sxy LAW 304 (1958).
104 UNIFORm SECURITIES AcT-r956, § 305(g)-
.. The Illinois statute relating to the escrow of promoters' shares reaches back five years. The
California statute has no time restriction. Indeed, the escrow provisions of this statute tic the hands of the
administrator even more than does the Uniform Sale of Securities Act of 1930. Cl. UNironat SALE O
SEeuRsaEs Aar OF 1930, § 14, 9 U.L.A. 649 (942).
... UNIFORM SEcRuIrTEs Acr--956, § 305(g).
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one of nine other conditions are met. 1 7 There is carried over from the 1930
Uniform Act and the 1953 tentative draft the noncontroversial condition that "the
offering has worked or tended to work a fraud upon the purchasers or would so
operate. ''"' Added is an important new condition that the offering may be halted
if "it has been or would be made with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and
sellers' discounts, commissions, or other compensation, or promoters' profits or par-
ticipation, or unreasonable amounts or kinds of options....- 99
Still absent from the Uniform Act, however, is the "fair, just, and equitable"
standard which is to be found in the statutes of at least sixteen states, including all
of those which have been the vanguard of securities regulation at the state level.
In justification of this crucial omission, we are told: "Administrative flexibility is
important in this area, but it must always be balanced against the proper claim of
legitimate business to as great a degree of specificity as the public interest will
permit."2 ° In the "border-line cases which are not quite fraudulent," the regulators
may order a prospectus to be used-the oral loophole being preserved-and rely upon
full disclosure, as in the Federal Securities Act.20' Professor Loss would, thus, scrap
some two decades of successful experience in the application of the "fairness" stand-
ard in state securities regulation on the ground that it is "too vague."
Unsupported generalizations of a necessity for greater specificity are far less con-
vincing than factual studies such as that of Mr. Albert K. Orschel on the administra-
tive supervision of voluntary plans of corporate reorganization and recapitalization
by use of the "fairness" standard. 02 In contrast with some of the current revela-
tions regarding certain federal administrative agencies, not including the SEC, Mr.
Orschel was impressed with the integrity and judgment of the California Com-
missioner and staff and concluded: "The result is a system in California which more
"" These include: (x) omissions or misstatements of material facts in the registration statement; (2)
willful violation of rules, orders, or conditions imposed in connection with the offering; (3) subsisting
administrative stop orders or injunctions applicable to the offering under any other federal or state
statute; and (4) illegality of the enterprise or method of business.
'UNIFORs SALE OF SEcuRITrEs AC OF 1930, § 8(i), 9 U.L.A. 642 (1942); UNIFo SEctUTIES
Acr § 7-1(3) (tentative draft 1953).
"'UNIFORM SEctRaTiEs Aar-1956, § 3o6(F). For the revelations in congressional hearings held in
1955 and 1956 of enormous bankers' and promoters' profits during the uranium boom, see Hearings,
supra note 9o , at 35-36, 579, passim. Compare the 1946 Statement of Policy of the National Association
of Securities Administrators relating to the granting of warrants or stock-purchase options to promoters
and underwriters. NAT'L Ass'N OF SECURITIEs ADm'RS, PROCEEDINGS 84 (946). See I CCH BLUE SKY
L. REP. 4571 (1945). For the SEC practice, see Universal Camera Corp., Securities Act Release No.
3076 (1945). A study by the Michigan Securities Commission is reported to have resulted in a finding
that underwriters often profit more from the exercise of warrants or stock-purchase options than from
the direct commissions received from the sale of securities. ILL. SEcuuTiEs DEP'T ANN. REP. 19 (954).
20 Louis Loss AND EDWARD CowFrr, BLUE SKY LAW 327 (1958). For a defense of this omission
by Professor Loss-a point which he finds "troublesome"--see NAT'L ASs'N OF SECURITES ADM'RS, PRO-
CEEDINGS 73-76 (956). He notes that in all cases of registration by qualification the administrator may
require that a prospectus be given to every buyer. UNIFORM SEcuurTiEs ACt'r-1956, § 3o4(d).
201 Louis Loss AND EDWAi CowETr, BLUE SKY LAW 328 (1958).
szOrschel, supra note 132. Mr. Orschel, a member of a leading Chicago law firm with a quarter
of a century of corporate practice, made this survey while a visiting professor at the Stanford Law
School. Unfortunately, Orschel's paper appears to have escaped the attention of the draftsmen of
the uniform act. See Louis Loss AND EDWARD CowTre, BLUE SKY LAW app. IV (1958).
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effectively protects security holders than have the courts in other states." 20 And he
adds: "[E]ven if some may bridle at the use of an administrative agency, the annoy-
ances and complaints which any such body of necessity draws to itself seem a reason-
able price for a forward looking answer to a difficult legal problem.20
Indeed, lurking behind the movement for uniform legislation in state securities
control is the distaste of a segment of the securities industry and the corporate bar
for the "paternalistic" blue-sky legislation found in certain midwestern, southern, and
western states which have adopted the "fair, just, and equitable" standard. If it
is assumed that the states which either have little or no securities regulation will
maintain their traditional position-and the tri-partite structure of the new Uniform
Act envisages just this result-it is the "fairness" states which will be "leveled"
should pressure groups operating under the banner of "promoting uniformity" suc-
ceed in displacing existing legislation with the new Act.2°6 It is perhaps this feature
of the Act which has caused one enthusiast to proclaim it to be "the greatest in-
vention since the wheel."2 6  Thus, for the Act to be an outstanding success and
accomplish the objective of "uniformity," it must break down the more restrictive
legislation of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin in the Midwest,
North Carolina and Texas in the South, and California, Washington, and Oregon
in the Far West;207 otherwise there is little point to the search for uniformity,
except the puristic one of similarity as to terms, definitions, and the like. The experi-
ence of these states disproves the notion that the fraud test adopted by the Uniform
Act plus limited control over promoters' and bankers' profits will provide a satis-
factory base for effective securities regulation. There is a real danger that under
the new Act, the courts will hold the fraud test to be applicable only to disclosures
in the registration statement (including misstatements and omissions) and not
sufficiently broad to proscribe unsound business ventures.208  For example, would
an alert administrator be able to halt a Tucker issue, as only California did in
x947?209 Aside from his ability to impose escrow and impound conditions and to
201 Orschel, supra note 132, at 236.
20 1 Id. at 235. 
-
2°In California, the Committee on Corporations of the Los Angeles Bar Association, after a careful
study of the Act, "has concluded that the Uniform Securities Act in its present form should be changed
in a number of significant respects, particularly to provide necessary protection for California investors,
and that as so changed the Uniform Securities Act would be a desirable blue sky law for California."
Los Angeles Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Corporations, The Uniform Securities Act, 33 L.A. BAR BULL.
67, 88 (1958). For the view of a member of the Corporation Commissioner's staff, see Pearce,
California Corporate Securities Law vs. Proposed Uniform Securities Law, 9 HAsrINos L.J. 1 (1957).
5 0 8Dcmmler, Progress Toward a Uniform Securities Act: A Result of the Harvard Law School
Study, Harv. L.S. Bull., Oct. i956, p. 16, 22.
""Other states using the "fair, just, and equitable" standard are: Alabama, Idaho, Montana, Ne-
braska, Tennessee, and West Virginia. Kansas, in adopting the new Uniform Act, no longer falls in this
category.
.0s But see Statement of Professor Loss, in NAT'L Ass'N OF SEculuRlas ADNO's, PROCeEDINGs 73
(956). This standard is probably unnecessary if the "fair, just, and equitable" test is adopted. The
"unsound business" criterion (but not that of "fairness") was inserted in § io of the Uniform Sale of
Securities Act of 193o. Both were excluded from the 1953 tentative draft and the Uniform Securities
Act-1956. Cf. UNIFORM SALE OF SEcuaRros Ac" oF 1930, § 5o, 9 U.L.A. 644 (1942).
20 See note 13o supra.
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control promoters' and bankers' profits, the administrator would have no authority
to prevent inequitable share structures or impose conditions as to waiver of dividend.
rights or the right to participate in assets on liquidation in an Old Dominion situa-
ton,210 not only in case of registration by notification and by coordination, but also
in all other circumstances.
Assuming that the fraud standard has some vague content beyond disclosure, it
certainly would not embrace inequity and unfairness. As a result, an administrator's.
hands would be tied so that he probably could not directly211 impose minimun
standards relating to security provisions in potentially inequitable situations where
there is a public offering of noncumulative preferred shares;212 where a provision in
a preferred share contract forbidding the corporation to purchase any preferred or
common shares when dividends are in arrears does not impose a similar restriction
upon subsidiaries; 1 3 where a preferred share contingent-voting provision provides
that the voting right shifts upon the passage of four consecutive quarterly dividends,
thereby permitting the postponement of a default by staggering the payment of
dividends;214 or where nonvoting common or preferred stock is offered to the
public. One other example might be mentioned where the fraud limitation may
not afford sufficient protection. A practice has developed in recent years of financing
a new venture by selling redeemable, nonconvertible preferred shares to the public
for cash, with the insiders taking the common, either for a slight cash investment or
as promotion shares. Under this "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose" arrangement, the public
investors not only, bear the risk of business failure, but can be deprived of a share
of the profits if the business succeeds. These examples will serve to indicate that
there are countless situations where the administrator needs the power to deny
registration on the ground that the proposed issue is not "fair, just, and equitable'"
to the outside shareholders. It is strange and unfortunate that a major objective of
the drive for uniformity seems to be that of eliminating this safeguard from state
securities regulation2 16
Moreover, standards of fairness to prevent inequitable arrangements in multi-
securities structures have been successfully imposed at the federal level under section
7(c) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act 10 and section 18 of the Investment
Companies Act 2 1 7  The stock exchanges view "with disfavor" the listing of non-
210 Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Company v. Lewisohn, 22o U.S. 2o6 (19o8). Again,
this is a regression from UNisosm SALE OF SEcuiun s AcT OF 1930, § 14, 9 U.L.A. 649 (1942).
" There may be some indirect sanctions. See Statement of Professor Loss, NAT'L ASS'N OF SE-
cURIrIEs ADT'RS, PROCEEDINGS 75 (1956).
21 See Guttman v. Illinois Central R. Co., 289 F.2d 927, 937 (2d Cir. 195i), cert. denied, 34Z
U.S. 867 (195) (Frank, Cir. J., suggesting "prophylactic administration action").
... Cf. Galdi v. Caribbean Sugar Co., 327 Mass. 402, 99 N.E.2d 69 (195).
" See BENJAMIN GRAHAM AN]) DAVID L. DoDD, SECURITY ANALYSIS 311 (3 d ed. i95i).
... See Louis Loss AND EDWAIW Cowsar, BLUE SKY LAW 283, 284, 327, 328 (i958).
210 49 STrA. 815 (935), 15 U.S.C. § 77g(c) (952). See Leary, Voting Rights in Preferred Stockc
Issues Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 27 TEx. L. REV. 749 (1949); Louis Loss,
SECuiTrIEs REGULATION 263 (595i).
21754 STAT. 817 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-i8 (1952). See Louis Loss, SEcuntrin REGULATIOm I00-
(195).
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voting common stocks or nonvoting preferreds which do not contain adequate
contingent voting clauses. 18 Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand
why it was determined to deny to a state securities administrator a similar discretion
with respect to offerings of securities.
(2) Exemptions. In this respect, the new Act follows closely the pattern of
previous attempts at uniformity. Among the exempt securities are all those listed
on the New York, American, and Midwest stock exchanges, as well as any other
security of the same issuer which is of senior or equal rank.210
Only "offers" and "sales" of unregistered securities (as distinguished from
"issues") are forbidden. 220 Moreover, the Act enacts the "no-sale" theory, reached
by administrative interpretation under the Federal Securities Act of 1933, by spe-
cifically excluding from the definition of "offer" and "sale" stock dividends and any
act incident to a "class vote by stockholders" pursuant to a charter amendment,
reclassification of securities, merger, consolidation, or sale of assets for stock.22
Although the draftsmen of the Model Act took the position that a general corpora-
tion statute should "enable" and that any "policing must be left to blue-sky
statutes, '1222 the draftsmen of the Uniform Securities Act now argue that223
this area sufficiently impinges upon the corporation law and other general law of the
states so that it seems better not to disturb whatever jurisprudence now applies by sub-
jecting these corporate events to the special statutory sanctions and remedies afforded
by the blue sky law.
These fundamental changes are, thus, to be free of administrative regulation at both
the state and the federal level.224
" See Statement of Listing Requirements as to Preferred Stock Voting Rights, N.Y. Stock Exchange,
May 4, 1940; Policy of Committee on Listing re Voting Rights, American Stock Exchange, Nov. x2,
1946. The London Stock Exchange has recently taken the position that "ordinary shares carrying
no voting rights should not be regarded with favor." 107 L.J. 561 (1957); see Mears, Nonvoting
Ordinary Shares, I J. Bus. L. 251 (1957).
219 UNIFORM SEcuRITiEs Acr-956, § 402(8). Cl. UNIFORM SALES OF SECURIIEs Ar' OF 1930,
§ 4 (f), 9 U.L.A. 632 (1942); UNIFORM SEcuRirrEs Aar § 3-1(6) (tentative draft 1953).
... UNIPORM SEcURITiEs ACT-1956, §5 3o, 401(j).
...1d. § 40(j)(6)(C). The drafting of the new Uniform Securities Act is almost flawless, but a
problem is posed by the "class vote" limitation where more than one class of shares is outstanding.
Under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1953), on a merger in a two-class situation, a class vote is not
mandatory, unless the certificate of incorporation so stipulates. If a class vote were not required, would
the exchange of securities constitute a "sale" under section 401? Compare the draftmen's commentary,
Louis Loss AND EDWARD CowEvr, A PROPOSED UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT-FINAL DRAFT AND COMMENTARY
104 (1956), with Louis Loss AND EDWARD COWETT, BLUE SKY LAw 347 (1958).
222 See text accompanying note 3I supra.
2' Louis Loss AND EDWARD CowsTr, BLUE SKY LAW 347 (1958). For the impact of the "no-sale"
theory on investor protection under the Federal Securities Act of 1933, see Sargent, A Review of the
"No-Sale" Theory of Rule 133, 13 BUsINEss LAWYER 78 (957); Purcell, 4 Consideration of the No-Sale
Theory under the Securities Act of 1933, 24 BROOKLYN L. REV. 254 (1958).
..The voluminous literature discussing the failure of the courts to curb what Professor E.
Merrick Dodd has called the "recapitalization racket" need not be collected here. After careful study,
Professor Dodd favored administrative over judicial supervision. Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitaliza.
tions, 55 H~Auv. L. REv. 780, 805, 816 (942); see also Orschel, supra note 132, at 2z8. Two courts have
proposed this alternative: Sherman v. Pepin Pickling Co., 230 Minn. 87, 41 N.W.2d 571 (195o); McNulty
v. W. & J. Sloane, 184 Misc. 835, 54 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1945). The SEC made a detailed study
ROLE OF STATES
In addition to these compulsory exchanges, the new Act exempts offers to exist-
ing security holders of the issuer if no commission or other remuneration (other
than a standby commission) is paid for soliciting security holders2 25  Accordingly,
most "voluntary recapitalizations" are, thus, exempted from administrative super-
vision.
The "isolated sale" problem is solved by exempting any transaction pursuant to an
offer directed to not more than ten persons (except institutional investors) during a
twelve-month period, if the seller reasonably believes that the buyers are purchasing
for investment and no commission is paid for soliciting prospects. The administrator
may, by rule or order, withdraw or further condition the exemption or increase or
decrease the number of offerees permitted. This broad discretion would appear to
permit him either to operate under the ten-offer rule or to adopt a closed-permit
procedure, such as that now found in California, or to take some middle course. 2 '
In general, in its basic structure, the new Uniform Act is an updated version of
the 193o Act and of the 1953 tentative draft. The most important innovations are
the new coordination procedure and the effort to control promoters' and bankers'
profits. The Act, however, is not one act, but three acts representing ascending
degrees of securities regulation-up to a point. What is conspicuously lacking is a
fourth act giving representation to the views of those states which have chosen to
make a more serious attempt to control the sale of securities 2 7  The failure to give
the same deference to the policies expressed in the statutes of these states as to the
statutes of the states with lax blue-sky laws undoubtedly is the basis for the dissatis-
faction leading to a withdrawal of approval given the new Act by the North Ameri-
can Securities Administrators
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of the problem and suggested remedial legislation. SEC, op. cit. supra note 133, Pt 7. The following
states exercise some administrative supervision over voluntary reorganizations, mergers, and consolidations:
California, Indiana, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. And see Cowett, Reorganizations, Consolida-
tions, Mergers and Related Corporate Events, 13 BusiNEss LAwYeR 418 (1958).
For administrative supervision by the Interstate Commerce Commission of the modification of rail-
road securities under section 20b of the Interstate Commerce Act, 62 STAT. 163 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 2ob
(1952), see Hand and Cummings, Consensual Securities Modification, 63 HARv. L. REv. 957 (950); Note,
Railroad Modification Act of r948, I STAN. L. REv. 676 (1949); Comment, Streamlined Capital
Readjustment Under Section 2ob of the Interstate Commerce Act, 58 YAL LJ. 1291 (1949); Hand
and Cummings, Funding Arrearages Under Section 2ob of the Interstate Commerce Act, 65 HAxv. L. REv.
398 (952); Wren, Feasibility and Fairness in Section 2ob Reorganizations, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 715
(1952).
"' UNIsORMs SECURmnEs AcT-s1956, § 4 02(b)(ss). .. Id. § 4 o2(b)(9).
1 Guesses as to the gross amount taken from fraudulent stock promotion in the United States
range from $5o,ooo,ooo to $350,ooo,ooo a year. A great part of this activity has centered in New
York City. See Fraudulent Stock Promotion: A Growth Industry?, Fortune, Aug. 1957, p. 135; Hear-
ings, supra note 9o , at 473-711.
For a recent lament because some of the more financially important states "constituting excellent sales
areas, have the so-called 'fair, equitable and just' blue-sky laws" and, therefore, are stifling the promo-
tion process (listing California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, and Texas), see Bruenner and Gilley, Pro-
moters, and their Profits, 13 BusiNEss LAWYER 429, 438 (1958). No mention was made of the curious
fact that these states continue to enjoy an astonishing economic growth.
518 See note 6 supra. In 1956, the NASA, after commending the draftsmen for their "invaluable
and outstanding contributions" to the cause of law and administration,
"RESOLVED, That insofar as may be practicable to promote uniformity in legislation, this
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
CONCLUSION
This is a large country, and it is to be expected that there will be strong differ-
ences of opinion, sectional and otherwise, with respect to corporation and securities
legislation. In some states, securities regulation is nonexistent; in others, its admin-
istration is so weak that it might as well be abolished; while in a number of states,
securities control is of a very high order. One of the virtues of our federal system
is that the national government may set a minimum standard of regulation and
leave to the states the opportunity to take additional measures if they so desire.229
'Too often, however, our uniform laws have constituted an amalgamation of common
-viewpoints in an area and a rejection of a more progressive position, with the
result that the proposed statute is inadequate, if not obsolete, soon after its promul-
gation. This has been particularly true of uniform legislation in the corporate regu-
lation field, and it is unfortunate since there is a wide variety of legislative and ad-
ministrative experience for any state which Would undertake a revision and integra-
tion of its corporation and securities laws. We should not allow our quests for
uniformity to obscure past achievements or serve as barriers to further progress.
convention assembled approve in the form presented the Uniform Securities Act, such approval
being qualified further as not indicating any opinion regarding any existing state securities law or
the acceptability of the Uniform Securities Act as a substitute therefor, and in no respect requiring
any individual Administrator voting in the affirmative hereon to sponsor, directly or indirectly,
the adoption of any such act by the Legislature of his jurisdiction." NAY'L Ass'N OF SECuIunits
ADm's, PROCEEDINGS, 112 (x956).
A "clarifying" resolution, adopted at the 1957 convention (Ohio abstaining) reads:
"WHEREAS it has been reported in certain publications of general circulation that the North
American Securities Administrators at Convention in x956 approved the proposed Uniform Securities
Act as presented to the convention by Dr. Louis Loss, and,
WHEREAS the Administrators did not approve or endorse said Act, but only endorsed the
.principle of uniformity in those areas in which the theories of securities laws are approximately the
same; and
WHEREAS, a clarification of the position of the Administrators appears necessary and ad.
visable,
Now, therefore, it is hereby resolved that the resolution as heretofore adopted in 1956 was
intended to and did commend the drafters of the proposed Act for the laborious task that they
undertook and performed but was not intended to and did not approve or recommend the
Uniform Act for adoption in any state." N. Am. SECURiTiEs ADm'ns, PROCEEDINGS 64 (s957).
For the interpretation placed on these resolutions by the draftsmen of the Uniform Act, see Louis
Loss AND EDWARD CowTr, BLUE SKY LAw V, 235 (958).
... See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUm. L. REv. 489, 495, 539-42
(1954); Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23 IowA L. REv. 459, 514-18 (1938).
